Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review
Time-consistent decision making in models of co-operation. / Dementieva, Maria; Neittaanmäki, Pekka; Zakharov, Victor.
2004. Paper presented at European Congress on Computational Methods in Applied Sciences and Engineering, ECCOMAS 2004, Jyvaskyla, Finland.Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review
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TY - CONF
T1 - Time-consistent decision making in models of co-operation
AU - Dementieva, Maria
AU - Neittaanmäki, Pekka
AU - Zakharov, Victor
PY - 2004/12/1
Y1 - 2004/12/1
N2 - An important problem in a dynamic decision making under co-operation is time-consistency of a solution. Time-consistency provides the optimality of the solution at any moment of the process with respect to relevant initial states. Otherwise, the absence of time-consistency in the optimality principle involves the possibility that the previous "optimal" decisions are abandoned at some current moment of time, thereby making meaningless the problem of seeking an optimal control. This is why particular emphasis is placed on the construction of time-consistent optimality principles. Up to now there were two approaches to regularization of time-inconsistent solution: imputation distribution procedures based on regularization of optimality principle and imputation distribution procedures based on delays of total payoffs to the players. In this work we apply the last method as well as a new one, which uses the reduced game property. We take a multistage cooperative game to model a dynamic process under conflict of actors and apply it to a real-life problem of common resource allocation.
AB - An important problem in a dynamic decision making under co-operation is time-consistency of a solution. Time-consistency provides the optimality of the solution at any moment of the process with respect to relevant initial states. Otherwise, the absence of time-consistency in the optimality principle involves the possibility that the previous "optimal" decisions are abandoned at some current moment of time, thereby making meaningless the problem of seeking an optimal control. This is why particular emphasis is placed on the construction of time-consistent optimality principles. Up to now there were two approaches to regularization of time-inconsistent solution: imputation distribution procedures based on regularization of optimality principle and imputation distribution procedures based on delays of total payoffs to the players. In this work we apply the last method as well as a new one, which uses the reduced game property. We take a multistage cooperative game to model a dynamic process under conflict of actors and apply it to a real-life problem of common resource allocation.
KW - Kyoto protocol
KW - Multistage cooperative games
KW - Reduced game
KW - Time-consistency
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84893501810&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Paper
AN - SCOPUS:84893501810
T2 - European Congress on Computational Methods in Applied Sciences and Engineering, ECCOMAS 2004
Y2 - 24 July 2004 through 28 July 2004
ER -
ID: 40898049