An important problem in a dynamic decision making under co-operation is time-consistency of a solution. Time-consistency provides the optimality of the solution at any moment of the process with respect to relevant initial states. Otherwise, the absence of time-consistency in the optimality principle involves the possibility that the previous "optimal" decisions are abandoned at some current moment of time, thereby making meaningless the problem of seeking an optimal control. This is why particular emphasis is placed on the construction of time-consistent optimality principles. Up to now there were two approaches to regularization of time-inconsistent solution: imputation distribution procedures based on regularization of optimality principle and imputation distribution procedures based on delays of total payoffs to the players. In this work we apply the last method as well as a new one, which uses the reduced game property. We take a multistage cooperative game to model a dynamic process under conflict of actors and apply it to a real-life problem of common resource allocation.

Original languageEnglish
StatePublished - 1 Dec 2004
EventEuropean Congress on Computational Methods in Applied Sciences and Engineering, ECCOMAS 2004 - Jyvaskyla, Finland
Duration: 24 Jul 200428 Jul 2004

Conference

ConferenceEuropean Congress on Computational Methods in Applied Sciences and Engineering, ECCOMAS 2004
Country/TerritoryFinland
CityJyvaskyla
Period24/07/0428/07/04

    Research areas

  • Kyoto protocol, Multistage cooperative games, Reduced game, Time-consistency

    Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Applied Mathematics

ID: 40898049