TY - CONF

T1 - Time-consistent decision making in models of co-operation

AU - Dementieva, Maria

AU - Neittaanmäki, Pekka

AU - Zakharov, Victor

PY - 2004/12/1

Y1 - 2004/12/1

N2 - An important problem in a dynamic decision making under co-operation is time-consistency of a solution. Time-consistency provides the optimality of the solution at any moment of the process with respect to relevant initial states. Otherwise, the absence of time-consistency in the optimality principle involves the possibility that the previous "optimal" decisions are abandoned at some current moment of time, thereby making meaningless the problem of seeking an optimal control. This is why particular emphasis is placed on the construction of time-consistent optimality principles. Up to now there were two approaches to regularization of time-inconsistent solution: imputation distribution procedures based on regularization of optimality principle and imputation distribution procedures based on delays of total payoffs to the players. In this work we apply the last method as well as a new one, which uses the reduced game property. We take a multistage cooperative game to model a dynamic process under conflict of actors and apply it to a real-life problem of common resource allocation.

AB - An important problem in a dynamic decision making under co-operation is time-consistency of a solution. Time-consistency provides the optimality of the solution at any moment of the process with respect to relevant initial states. Otherwise, the absence of time-consistency in the optimality principle involves the possibility that the previous "optimal" decisions are abandoned at some current moment of time, thereby making meaningless the problem of seeking an optimal control. This is why particular emphasis is placed on the construction of time-consistent optimality principles. Up to now there were two approaches to regularization of time-inconsistent solution: imputation distribution procedures based on regularization of optimality principle and imputation distribution procedures based on delays of total payoffs to the players. In this work we apply the last method as well as a new one, which uses the reduced game property. We take a multistage cooperative game to model a dynamic process under conflict of actors and apply it to a real-life problem of common resource allocation.

KW - Kyoto protocol

KW - Multistage cooperative games

KW - Reduced game

KW - Time-consistency

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84893501810&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Paper

AN - SCOPUS:84893501810

T2 - European Congress on Computational Methods in Applied Sciences and Engineering, ECCOMAS 2004

Y2 - 24 July 2004 through 28 July 2004

ER -