We study the fragmentation-coagulation, or merging and splitting, model as introduced in Kolokoltsov (Math Oper Res, 2016, in press, doi:10.1287/moor.2016.0838), where N small players can form coalitions to resist to the pressure exerted by the principal. It is a Markov chain in continuous time, and the players have a common reward to optimize. We study the behavior as N grows and show that the problem converges to a (one player) deterministic optimization problem in continuous time, in the infinite dimensional state space l1. We apply the method developed in Gast et al. (IEEE Trans Autom Control 57:2266–2280, 2012), adapting it to our different framework. We use tools involving dynamics in l1, generators of Markov processes, martingale problems, and coupling of Markov chains.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAnnals of the International Society of Dynamic Games
PublisherBirkhäuser Verlag AG
Pages71-106
Number of pages36
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2017

Publication series

NameAnnals of the International Society of Dynamic Games
Volume15
ISSN (Print)2474-0179
ISSN (Electronic)2474-0187

    Research areas

  • Evolutionary coalition formation, Fragmentation-coagulation, Major agent, Markov decision process, Mean field limit, Merging and splitting

    Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Applied Mathematics

ID: 51530490