Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable? / Su, Shimai ; Parilina, Elena M. .
In: Operations Research Letters, Vol. 51, No. 3, 01.05.2023, p. 370-377.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable?
AU - Su, Shimai
AU - Parilina, Elena M.
PY - 2023/5/1
Y1 - 2023/5/1
N2 - We consider an asymmetric differential game of pollution control with a developing country and two developed countries. The developing country is invulnerable to the pollution in contrast to the developed ones. Assuming partial cooperation, we examine all coalition structures composed by three players and provide the stability conditions for them using two approaches: (i) Nash stability, (ii) individual stability. First, the case of nontransferable payoffs is examined. Second, a transfer payment scheme is proposed to make particular coalition structures stable.
AB - We consider an asymmetric differential game of pollution control with a developing country and two developed countries. The developing country is invulnerable to the pollution in contrast to the developed ones. Assuming partial cooperation, we examine all coalition structures composed by three players and provide the stability conditions for them using two approaches: (i) Nash stability, (ii) individual stability. First, the case of nontransferable payoffs is examined. Second, a transfer payment scheme is proposed to make particular coalition structures stable.
KW - Differential game
KW - pollution control
KW - Partial cooperation
KW - Coalition structure
KW - Stability
KW - Transfer payment scheme
KW - Pollution control
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/df27c3a4-36e7-3c83-84fb-1bebf4543489/
U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2023.05.003
DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2023.05.003
M3 - Article
VL - 51
SP - 370
EP - 377
JO - Operations Research Letters
JF - Operations Research Letters
SN - 0167-6377
IS - 3
ER -
ID: 105306350