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Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable? / Su, Shimai ; Parilina, Elena M. .

в: Operations Research Letters, Том 51, № 3, 01.05.2023, стр. 370-377.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование

Harvard

Su, S & Parilina, EM 2023, 'Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable?', Operations Research Letters, Том. 51, № 3, стр. 370-377. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2023.05.003

APA

Su, S., & Parilina, E. M. (2023). Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable? Operations Research Letters, 51(3), 370-377. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2023.05.003

Vancouver

Su S, Parilina EM. Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable? Operations Research Letters. 2023 Май 1;51(3):370-377. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2023.05.003

Author

Su, Shimai ; Parilina, Elena M. . / Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable?. в: Operations Research Letters. 2023 ; Том 51, № 3. стр. 370-377.

BibTeX

@article{5b07f97aa0544ac0b09e22d372187d4f,
title = "Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable?",
abstract = "We consider an asymmetric differential game of pollution control with a developing country and two developed countries. The developing country is invulnerable to the pollution in contrast to the developed ones. Assuming partial cooperation, we examine all coalition structures composed by three players and provide the stability conditions for them using two approaches: (i) Nash stability, (ii) individual stability. First, the case of nontransferable payoffs is examined. Second, a transfer payment scheme is proposed to make particular coalition structures stable.",
keywords = "Differential game, pollution control, Partial cooperation, Coalition structure, Stability, Transfer payment scheme, Pollution control",
author = "Shimai Su and Parilina, {Elena M.}",
year = "2023",
month = may,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.orl.2023.05.003",
language = "English",
volume = "51",
pages = "370--377",
journal = "Operations Research Letters",
issn = "0167-6377",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable?

AU - Su, Shimai

AU - Parilina, Elena M.

PY - 2023/5/1

Y1 - 2023/5/1

N2 - We consider an asymmetric differential game of pollution control with a developing country and two developed countries. The developing country is invulnerable to the pollution in contrast to the developed ones. Assuming partial cooperation, we examine all coalition structures composed by three players and provide the stability conditions for them using two approaches: (i) Nash stability, (ii) individual stability. First, the case of nontransferable payoffs is examined. Second, a transfer payment scheme is proposed to make particular coalition structures stable.

AB - We consider an asymmetric differential game of pollution control with a developing country and two developed countries. The developing country is invulnerable to the pollution in contrast to the developed ones. Assuming partial cooperation, we examine all coalition structures composed by three players and provide the stability conditions for them using two approaches: (i) Nash stability, (ii) individual stability. First, the case of nontransferable payoffs is examined. Second, a transfer payment scheme is proposed to make particular coalition structures stable.

KW - Differential game

KW - pollution control

KW - Partial cooperation

KW - Coalition structure

KW - Stability

KW - Transfer payment scheme

KW - Pollution control

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/df27c3a4-36e7-3c83-84fb-1bebf4543489/

U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2023.05.003

DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2023.05.003

M3 - Article

VL - 51

SP - 370

EP - 377

JO - Operations Research Letters

JF - Operations Research Letters

SN - 0167-6377

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 105306350