Analyzing the practice of the Constitutional Court of Russia, the author of this article seeks to assess how much the Court considers itself bound by its previous decisions and the legal positions formulated in them. The study of the data array of decisions of the Constitutional Court shows that the practice of the Court is characterized by a high level of references to previous decisions, which makes this practice largely connected into a single whole. However, the subsequent substantive analysis of the decisions of the Constitutional Court makes the author come to the conclusion that despite numerous references to its own practice, the Court does not recognize either its own connectedness with its individual previous decisions (the principle of stare decisis), nor the binding for itself of a consistent line of its own decisions forming a common legal position (jurisprudence constante). Departing from the previously formed positions, the Constitutional Court does not consider it necessary to even directly state this, not to mention explanations and arguments for such deviations, which, on the one hand, allows an unbiased decision-making based on the circumstances of a particular situation, but on the other hand, retains a significant degree of uncertainty regarding the constitutional and legal regulation reflected in the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.