In the contemporary science studies – in the philosophy of science, sociology of scientific knowledge, and historical epistemology – there is a criticism regarding the position of normativism. The essence of the criticized approach can be clarified by referring to the position of I. Lakatos suggesting the philosophy of science should develop a normative methodology for the rational reconstruction of the history of science, as well as for the subsequent evaluation of competing scientific theories. This approach seems to be limited for several reasons. As an alternative, the position of descriptivism implies the rejection of any prerequisites for the interpretation of research and any meta-language for the development of science assessment. This second approach includes attention to the scientific practices themselves in their diversity and variability. However, the position of descriptivism represents another extreme in the science studies, since it calls into question the autonomy of the work of the philosopher or epistemologist; it turns out to be vague in its own purpose and completion. This article discusses the need and possible movement from these extremes.