Our lecture is devoted to the development of the deductive model of law enforcement Eugenio Bulygin, an influential Argentinian legal scholar and philosopher of law, celebrating his 90th birthday in 2021. In the 1970s, E. Bulygin and his co-author, a famous Argentinian logician Carlos Alchourron proposed a modification of the deductive model of law enforcement. They incorporated three groups of ideas new for that time into it: H. von Wright’s deontic logic, the Alchourron’s deontic formalisms for modeling of the logic of norms as distinct from the logic of normative propositions and Bulygin’s conception of the exclusive legal positivism. According to Bulygin, the rationale for the decision presented as deductive reasoning puts an agent’s cognitive work of the law enforcement, judge or legal analyst, aiming at eliminating various gaps, of knowledge, recognition or attribution, outside the scene of its logical reconstruction. At the first stage, the deduction consists in deriving a generic norm relevant to the case, the properties of which are formulated by the legislator, and in the second stage, the judge deduces an individual norm in relation to the actual description of the case. We believe that the requirement of the logical correctness of the justification of the decision, which is the cornerstone of the deductive model of law enforcement, is insufficient, because it does not provide formal justification of the decision. It is also an overly restrictive limitation because it cannot demonstrate the compatibility and coherence of the individual substantive steps of justification. This means that for the construction of the justification, the discarding of incoherent elements turns out to be more important than the observance of the logical correctness requirement.