The article deals the concept of human rights from the standpoint of the communicative theory of law and in comparison with the views of E. Fittipaldi. Fittipaldi justifies the concept of human rights based on the psychological theory of law adhering at the same time to the “strict Petrażyckianism”. The author gives arguments to justify the impossibility of consistent and integral legal theory based on “strict Petrażyckianism” which interprets the law as personal imperative-attributive emotions experienced within the individual's consciousness. The author also provides arguments to support the position that the intuitive law in Petrażycki′s psychological theory of law does not correspond to the criteria proposed by Petrażycki, and in reality constitutes a law based on institutional norms. Human emotions, especially lasting and regularly recurring ones, are accompanied by intellectual representations. It means that they are not only experienced, but also comprehended (understood as the being experienced). By this way they are associated with regulatory ideas, with the ideas about rights and obligations through a symbolic (textual) form of their expression. That is why any person can intellectually understand the necessity to follow the legal norms on the basis of its social (institutional) importance, without experiencing in this regard an imperative-attributive emotion, however understanding the content of the relevant rights and obligations. According to the author, the law is possible only as a connection between agents (intersubjective relationship) based on their interaction caused by the same understanding of standard, legitimized and institutional texts