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Strong Strategic Support of Cooperation in Multistage Games. / Petrosyan, Leon.
в: International Game Theory Review, Том 21, № 1, 1940004, 2019.Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Strong Strategic Support of Cooperation in Multistage Games
AU - Petrosyan, Leon
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - The problem of cooperation in repeated and multistage games is considered. The strong equilibrium (equilibrium stable against deviations of coalitions) with payoffs which can be attained under cooperation is constructed for a wide class of such games. The new solution concept based on solutions of stage games is introduced and in some cases this solution is a subset of the core defined for repeated and multistage games in a classical way. It is also proved that this newly introduced solution concept is strongly time consistent. The strong time consistency of the solution is a very important property since in case it does not take place players in reality in some time instant in subgame on cooperative trajectory may switch from the previously selected optimal solution to any other optimal solution in the subgame and as result realize the solution which will not be optimal in the whole game.
AB - The problem of cooperation in repeated and multistage games is considered. The strong equilibrium (equilibrium stable against deviations of coalitions) with payoffs which can be attained under cooperation is constructed for a wide class of such games. The new solution concept based on solutions of stage games is introduced and in some cases this solution is a subset of the core defined for repeated and multistage games in a classical way. It is also proved that this newly introduced solution concept is strongly time consistent. The strong time consistency of the solution is a very important property since in case it does not take place players in reality in some time instant in subgame on cooperative trajectory may switch from the previously selected optimal solution to any other optimal solution in the subgame and as result realize the solution which will not be optimal in the whole game.
KW - cooperative game
KW - core
KW - Strong equilibrium
KW - strongly time consistency
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85064600780&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.mendeley.com/research/strong-strategic-support-cooperation-multistage-games
U2 - 10.1142/S0219198919400048
DO - 10.1142/S0219198919400048
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85064600780
VL - 21
JO - International Game Theory Review
JF - International Game Theory Review
SN - 0219-1989
IS - 1
M1 - 1940004
ER -
ID: 48986179