Strong Strategic Support of Cooperation in Multistage Games

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Strong Strategic Support of Cooperation in Multistage Games. / Petrosyan, Leon.

In: International Game Theory Review, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1940004, 2019.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

BibTeX

@article{8b63a2086fea4defa2eb9b61da239e20,

title = "Strong Strategic Support of Cooperation in Multistage Games",

abstract = "The problem of cooperation in repeated and multistage games is considered. The strong equilibrium (equilibrium stable against deviations of coalitions) with payoffs which can be attained under cooperation is constructed for a wide class of such games. The new solution concept based on solutions of stage games is introduced and in some cases this solution is a subset of the core defined for repeated and multistage games in a classical way. It is also proved that this newly introduced solution concept is strongly time consistent. The strong time consistency of the solution is a very important property since in case it does not take place players in reality in some time instant in subgame on cooperative trajectory may switch from the previously selected optimal solution to any other optimal solution in the subgame and as result realize the solution which will not be optimal in the whole game.",

keywords = "cooperative game, core, Strong equilibrium, strongly time consistency",

author = "Leon Petrosyan",

year = "2019",

doi = "10.1142/S0219198919400048",

language = "English",

volume = "21",

journal = "International Game Theory Review",

issn = "0219-1989",

publisher = "WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD",

number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strong Strategic Support of Cooperation in Multistage Games

AU - Petrosyan, Leon

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - The problem of cooperation in repeated and multistage games is considered. The strong equilibrium (equilibrium stable against deviations of coalitions) with payoffs which can be attained under cooperation is constructed for a wide class of such games. The new solution concept based on solutions of stage games is introduced and in some cases this solution is a subset of the core defined for repeated and multistage games in a classical way. It is also proved that this newly introduced solution concept is strongly time consistent. The strong time consistency of the solution is a very important property since in case it does not take place players in reality in some time instant in subgame on cooperative trajectory may switch from the previously selected optimal solution to any other optimal solution in the subgame and as result realize the solution which will not be optimal in the whole game.

AB - The problem of cooperation in repeated and multistage games is considered. The strong equilibrium (equilibrium stable against deviations of coalitions) with payoffs which can be attained under cooperation is constructed for a wide class of such games. The new solution concept based on solutions of stage games is introduced and in some cases this solution is a subset of the core defined for repeated and multistage games in a classical way. It is also proved that this newly introduced solution concept is strongly time consistent. The strong time consistency of the solution is a very important property since in case it does not take place players in reality in some time instant in subgame on cooperative trajectory may switch from the previously selected optimal solution to any other optimal solution in the subgame and as result realize the solution which will not be optimal in the whole game.

KW - cooperative game

KW - core

KW - Strong equilibrium

KW - strongly time consistency

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85064600780&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.mendeley.com/research/strong-strategic-support-cooperation-multistage-games

U2 - 10.1142/S0219198919400048

DO - 10.1142/S0219198919400048

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85064600780

VL - 21

JO - International Game Theory Review

JF - International Game Theory Review

SN - 0219-1989

IS - 1

M1 - 1940004

ER -

ID: 48986179