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PRO-CREATIVE FUNCTION OF PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION IN KANT’S FIRST CRITIQUE. DISCUSSION REMARK ON THE BOOK OF SAULIUS GENIUSAS “PHENOMENOLOGY OF PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION: EMBODIMENT, LANGUAGE, SUBJECTIVITY” (Ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2021. ISBN-13: 978-3-8382-1552-5). / Artemenko, Natalia.

в: HORIZON:ФЕНОМЕНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ, Том 12, № 1, 06.2023, стр. 216-234.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданияхстатьяРецензирование

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@article{3f0899f0070544fa9165e9406d283d9d,
title = "PRO-CREATIVE FUNCTION OF PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION IN KANT{\textquoteright}S FIRST CRITIQUE. DISCUSSION REMARK ON THE BOOK OF SAULIUS GENIUSAS “PHENOMENOLOGY OF PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION: EMBODIMENT, LANGUAGE, SUBJECTIVITY” (Ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2021. ISBN-13: 978-3-8382-1552-5)",
abstract = "The aim of our “discussion remark” is not to present a critical review on the book written by S.Geniusas, a brilliant study notable by its extreme painstakingness, historical sensitivity and terminologicalaccuracy, but rather to delve deeply into the origins of phenomenological understanding of productiveimagination, i.e., to turn “back to Kant”, given in Saulius Geniusas{\textquoteright} book (the first chapter) for introductory reason. We proceed from S.Geniusas remark that productive imagination establishes a relation between different abilities, reconciles the antagonism between them and, in this respect, exercisesa pro-creative function. We reveal that it is this pro-creative element of productive imagination thatbrings it closer to time (as indicated by Viktor Molchanov, a prominent Russian phenomenologist, in his study of 1988) and serves as the basis for gaining new knowledge. Imagination acts as a limit forreflection, however, it gets revealed only through reflecting, and, thus, it proves to be connected witha fundamental layer of consciousness, which appears both as an object and as a means of describingreflection, i.e., as time. The convergence, or rather, identification, of time with imagination lies in thevery fact that both of them exercise an objective function: time — as a possibility for semantic definition of objectivity, imagination — as a basis for a possibility of any knowledge. Moreover, imaginationturns out to be a source of a paradox and, ultimately, the only thing that explains self-cognition.",
keywords = "productive imagination, Kant, function of time, temporal syntheses, knowledge, subjective deduction, pro-creative function, продуктивное воображение, Кант, функция времени, темпоральные синтезы, знание, субъективная дедукция, творческая функция",
author = "Natalia Artemenko",
year = "2023",
month = jun,
language = "English",
volume = "12",
pages = "216--234",
journal = "Horizon. Fenomenologiceskie Issledovania",
issn = "2226-5260",
publisher = "Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - PRO-CREATIVE FUNCTION OF PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION IN KANT’S FIRST CRITIQUE. DISCUSSION REMARK ON THE BOOK OF SAULIUS GENIUSAS “PHENOMENOLOGY OF PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION: EMBODIMENT, LANGUAGE, SUBJECTIVITY” (Ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2021. ISBN-13: 978-3-8382-1552-5)

AU - Artemenko, Natalia

PY - 2023/6

Y1 - 2023/6

N2 - The aim of our “discussion remark” is not to present a critical review on the book written by S.Geniusas, a brilliant study notable by its extreme painstakingness, historical sensitivity and terminologicalaccuracy, but rather to delve deeply into the origins of phenomenological understanding of productiveimagination, i.e., to turn “back to Kant”, given in Saulius Geniusas’ book (the first chapter) for introductory reason. We proceed from S.Geniusas remark that productive imagination establishes a relation between different abilities, reconciles the antagonism between them and, in this respect, exercisesa pro-creative function. We reveal that it is this pro-creative element of productive imagination thatbrings it closer to time (as indicated by Viktor Molchanov, a prominent Russian phenomenologist, in his study of 1988) and serves as the basis for gaining new knowledge. Imagination acts as a limit forreflection, however, it gets revealed only through reflecting, and, thus, it proves to be connected witha fundamental layer of consciousness, which appears both as an object and as a means of describingreflection, i.e., as time. The convergence, or rather, identification, of time with imagination lies in thevery fact that both of them exercise an objective function: time — as a possibility for semantic definition of objectivity, imagination — as a basis for a possibility of any knowledge. Moreover, imaginationturns out to be a source of a paradox and, ultimately, the only thing that explains self-cognition.

AB - The aim of our “discussion remark” is not to present a critical review on the book written by S.Geniusas, a brilliant study notable by its extreme painstakingness, historical sensitivity and terminologicalaccuracy, but rather to delve deeply into the origins of phenomenological understanding of productiveimagination, i.e., to turn “back to Kant”, given in Saulius Geniusas’ book (the first chapter) for introductory reason. We proceed from S.Geniusas remark that productive imagination establishes a relation between different abilities, reconciles the antagonism between them and, in this respect, exercisesa pro-creative function. We reveal that it is this pro-creative element of productive imagination thatbrings it closer to time (as indicated by Viktor Molchanov, a prominent Russian phenomenologist, in his study of 1988) and serves as the basis for gaining new knowledge. Imagination acts as a limit forreflection, however, it gets revealed only through reflecting, and, thus, it proves to be connected witha fundamental layer of consciousness, which appears both as an object and as a means of describingreflection, i.e., as time. The convergence, or rather, identification, of time with imagination lies in thevery fact that both of them exercise an objective function: time — as a possibility for semantic definition of objectivity, imagination — as a basis for a possibility of any knowledge. Moreover, imaginationturns out to be a source of a paradox and, ultimately, the only thing that explains self-cognition.

KW - productive imagination

KW - Kant

KW - function of time

KW - temporal syntheses

KW - knowledge

KW - subjective deduction

KW - pro-creative function

KW - продуктивное воображение

KW - Кант

KW - функция времени

KW - темпоральные синтезы

KW - знание

KW - субъективная дедукция

KW - творческая функция

M3 - Article

VL - 12

SP - 216

EP - 234

JO - Horizon. Fenomenologiceskie Issledovania

JF - Horizon. Fenomenologiceskie Issledovania

SN - 2226-5260

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 107389877