TY - JOUR

T1 - LAW and LOGIC

T2 - E. BULYGIN‟S DEDUCTIVE PATTERN of JUDICIAL REASONING

AU - Timoshina, Elena

AU - Kraevsky, Arseny

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Khachatur Abovyan Armenian State Pedagogical University. All rights reserved.

PY - 2021/12/10

Y1 - 2021/12/10

N2 - In the twentieth century the debate over the possibilities and limits of logic in law became particularly acute with the emergence of judicial realism, a philosophical and legal trend which denied the deductive nature of judicial decision-making. This compromised the theory of judicial syllogism, assuming that a judicial decision could be deduced as a logical consequence from the premises - norms and facts, and generally provoked a sceptical attitude towards logic in law. The subject of the article is the deductive model of justification of judicial decisions proposed by the outstanding legal philosopher Eugenio Bulygin. The aim of the article is to show Bulygin’s contribution to the improvement of the deductive model of judicial reasoning. The main innovations Bulygin brought to the deductive model of judicial reasoning are: 1) justifying, based on logical analysis and open texture of language theory, the analytical character of the court interpretative sentences; 2) distinguishing the individual and the generic subsumptions, etc. At the same time, the authors conclude that Bulygin’s improved deductive theory is not free from criticism, as the Argentine jurist does not succeed in complete eliminating doubts about the logical deducibility of at least some categories of decisions from general rules.

AB - In the twentieth century the debate over the possibilities and limits of logic in law became particularly acute with the emergence of judicial realism, a philosophical and legal trend which denied the deductive nature of judicial decision-making. This compromised the theory of judicial syllogism, assuming that a judicial decision could be deduced as a logical consequence from the premises - norms and facts, and generally provoked a sceptical attitude towards logic in law. The subject of the article is the deductive model of justification of judicial decisions proposed by the outstanding legal philosopher Eugenio Bulygin. The aim of the article is to show Bulygin’s contribution to the improvement of the deductive model of judicial reasoning. The main innovations Bulygin brought to the deductive model of judicial reasoning are: 1) justifying, based on logical analysis and open texture of language theory, the analytical character of the court interpretative sentences; 2) distinguishing the individual and the generic subsumptions, etc. At the same time, the authors conclude that Bulygin’s improved deductive theory is not free from criticism, as the Argentine jurist does not succeed in complete eliminating doubts about the logical deducibility of at least some categories of decisions from general rules.

KW - юридическая аргументация

KW - применение права

KW - Е.В.Булыгин

KW - логика в праве

KW - юридический силлогизм

KW - правовой реализм

KW - субсумция

KW - судебное решение

KW - legal reasoning

KW - application of law

KW - creation of law

KW - E. Bulygin

KW - logic in law

KW - judicial syllogism

KW - legal realism

KW - subsumption

KW - judicial decision

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85122150416&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.24234/wisdom.v1i1.673

DO - 10.24234/wisdom.v1i1.673

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85122150416

VL - 1

SP - 212

EP - 222

JO - Wisdom

JF - Wisdom

SN - 1829-3824

IS - 1

ER -