TY - JOUR

T1 - How to deal with an intelligent adversary

AU - Garnaev, A.

AU - Baykal-Gursoy, M.

AU - Vincent Poor, H.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. Traditionally, the design of network protection strategies is based on the answers of a protector and an adversary to the question "How?": how should the protector allocate its protection resources, and how should the adversary allocate its attacking resources? This paper considers a more sophisticated adversary, who, planning its malicious activities, considers two questions: "What for?" and "How?". Namely, what is the motivation for the attack? and how to attack based on the chosen motivation? To study this problem, a simple game-theoretic network protection model is considered, in which the adversary decides whether to intrude on the network to inflict maximal damage or to perform a reconnaissance mission, and based on this decision an intrusion strategy is designed. The solution to this game shows that such an adversary may try a feint to draw the protector's efforts away from the nodes that the adversary intends to attack. Taking into account this feature of the adversary's behavior

AB - © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. Traditionally, the design of network protection strategies is based on the answers of a protector and an adversary to the question "How?": how should the protector allocate its protection resources, and how should the adversary allocate its attacking resources? This paper considers a more sophisticated adversary, who, planning its malicious activities, considers two questions: "What for?" and "How?". Namely, what is the motivation for the attack? and how to attack based on the chosen motivation? To study this problem, a simple game-theoretic network protection model is considered, in which the adversary decides whether to intrude on the network to inflict maximal damage or to perform a reconnaissance mission, and based on this decision an intrusion strategy is designed. The solution to this game shows that such an adversary may try a feint to draw the protector's efforts away from the nodes that the adversary intends to attack. Taking into account this feature of the adversary's behavior

U2 - 10.1016/j.cie.2015.10.001

DO - 10.1016/j.cie.2015.10.001

M3 - Article

VL - 90

SP - 352

EP - 360

JO - Computers and Industrial Engineering

JF - Computers and Industrial Engineering

SN - 0360-8352

ER -