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How to deal with an intelligent adversary. / Garnaev, A.; Baykal-Gursoy, M.; Vincent Poor, H.

In: Computers and Industrial Engineering, Vol. 90, 2015, p. 352–360.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Garnaev, A, Baykal-Gursoy, M & Vincent Poor, H 2015, 'How to deal with an intelligent adversary', Computers and Industrial Engineering, vol. 90, pp. 352–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2015.10.001

APA

Garnaev, A., Baykal-Gursoy, M., & Vincent Poor, H. (2015). How to deal with an intelligent adversary. Computers and Industrial Engineering, 90, 352–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2015.10.001

Vancouver

Garnaev A, Baykal-Gursoy M, Vincent Poor H. How to deal with an intelligent adversary. Computers and Industrial Engineering. 2015;90:352–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2015.10.001

Author

Garnaev, A. ; Baykal-Gursoy, M. ; Vincent Poor, H. / How to deal with an intelligent adversary. In: Computers and Industrial Engineering. 2015 ; Vol. 90. pp. 352–360.

BibTeX

@article{3ec2afee01f94f2787a959d23af92efd,
title = "How to deal with an intelligent adversary",
abstract = "{\textcopyright} 2015 Elsevier Ltd. Traditionally, the design of network protection strategies is based on the answers of a protector and an adversary to the question {"}How?{"}: how should the protector allocate its protection resources, and how should the adversary allocate its attacking resources? This paper considers a more sophisticated adversary, who, planning its malicious activities, considers two questions: {"}What for?{"} and {"}How?{"}. Namely, what is the motivation for the attack? and how to attack based on the chosen motivation? To study this problem, a simple game-theoretic network protection model is considered, in which the adversary decides whether to intrude on the network to inflict maximal damage or to perform a reconnaissance mission, and based on this decision an intrusion strategy is designed. The solution to this game shows that such an adversary may try a feint to draw the protector's efforts away from the nodes that the adversary intends to attack. Taking into account this feature of the adversary's behavior",
author = "A. Garnaev and M. Baykal-Gursoy and {Vincent Poor}, H.",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.1016/j.cie.2015.10.001",
language = "English",
volume = "90",
pages = "352–360",
journal = "Computers and Industrial Engineering",
issn = "0360-8352",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - How to deal with an intelligent adversary

AU - Garnaev, A.

AU - Baykal-Gursoy, M.

AU - Vincent Poor, H.

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. Traditionally, the design of network protection strategies is based on the answers of a protector and an adversary to the question "How?": how should the protector allocate its protection resources, and how should the adversary allocate its attacking resources? This paper considers a more sophisticated adversary, who, planning its malicious activities, considers two questions: "What for?" and "How?". Namely, what is the motivation for the attack? and how to attack based on the chosen motivation? To study this problem, a simple game-theoretic network protection model is considered, in which the adversary decides whether to intrude on the network to inflict maximal damage or to perform a reconnaissance mission, and based on this decision an intrusion strategy is designed. The solution to this game shows that such an adversary may try a feint to draw the protector's efforts away from the nodes that the adversary intends to attack. Taking into account this feature of the adversary's behavior

AB - © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. Traditionally, the design of network protection strategies is based on the answers of a protector and an adversary to the question "How?": how should the protector allocate its protection resources, and how should the adversary allocate its attacking resources? This paper considers a more sophisticated adversary, who, planning its malicious activities, considers two questions: "What for?" and "How?". Namely, what is the motivation for the attack? and how to attack based on the chosen motivation? To study this problem, a simple game-theoretic network protection model is considered, in which the adversary decides whether to intrude on the network to inflict maximal damage or to perform a reconnaissance mission, and based on this decision an intrusion strategy is designed. The solution to this game shows that such an adversary may try a feint to draw the protector's efforts away from the nodes that the adversary intends to attack. Taking into account this feature of the adversary's behavior

U2 - 10.1016/j.cie.2015.10.001

DO - 10.1016/j.cie.2015.10.001

M3 - Article

VL - 90

SP - 352

EP - 360

JO - Computers and Industrial Engineering

JF - Computers and Industrial Engineering

SN - 0360-8352

ER -

ID: 3982981