Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › глава/раздел › Рецензирование
Hierarchical Model of Corruption : Game-Theoretic Approach. / Orlov, Ivan M.; Kumacheva, Suriya Sh.
Trends in Mathematics. Springer Nature, 2021. стр. 251-267 (Trends in Mathematics).Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › глава/раздел › Рецензирование
}
TY - CHAP
T1 - Hierarchical Model of Corruption
T2 - Game-Theoretic Approach
AU - Orlov, Ivan M.
AU - Kumacheva, Suriya Sh
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - Corruption occurs in relations between people and companies—agents who, in order to benefit from it, should make strategic decisions. This condition makes it possible to use game-theoretic apparatus to analyze it and there are many scientific works on the topic yet they mostly address the corruption in form of game between two or maximum three players. This research differs in its approach: it broadens the scope and analyzes corrupt agents acting not isolated but as parts of a bigger hierarchical structure in hope to obtain insights that may help to combat corruption in organizations. A subhierarchical two-stage game-theoretic model of embezzlement and bribery is created, the particular example with six officials on three levels is solved via computer simulation, settings for corruption minimizing and mild corruption minimizing are suggested and the cooperative extension is suggested.
AB - Corruption occurs in relations between people and companies—agents who, in order to benefit from it, should make strategic decisions. This condition makes it possible to use game-theoretic apparatus to analyze it and there are many scientific works on the topic yet they mostly address the corruption in form of game between two or maximum three players. This research differs in its approach: it broadens the scope and analyzes corrupt agents acting not isolated but as parts of a bigger hierarchical structure in hope to obtain insights that may help to combat corruption in organizations. A subhierarchical two-stage game-theoretic model of embezzlement and bribery is created, the particular example with six officials on three levels is solved via computer simulation, settings for corruption minimizing and mild corruption minimizing are suggested and the cooperative extension is suggested.
KW - Bribery
KW - Corruption
KW - Corruption minimizing strategies
KW - Embezzlement
KW - Equilibria
KW - Hierarchical game
KW - Inspection
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85126709823&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_14
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_14
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85126709823
T3 - Trends in Mathematics
SP - 251
EP - 267
BT - Trends in Mathematics
PB - Springer Nature
ER -
ID: 95677386