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Hierarchical Model of Corruption : Game-Theoretic Approach. / Orlov, Ivan M.; Kumacheva, Suriya Sh.

Trends in Mathematics. Springer Nature, 2021. p. 251-267 (Trends in Mathematics).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Orlov, IM & Kumacheva, SS 2021, Hierarchical Model of Corruption: Game-Theoretic Approach. in Trends in Mathematics. Trends in Mathematics, Springer Nature, pp. 251-267. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_14

APA

Orlov, I. M., & Kumacheva, S. S. (2021). Hierarchical Model of Corruption: Game-Theoretic Approach. In Trends in Mathematics (pp. 251-267). (Trends in Mathematics). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_14

Vancouver

Orlov IM, Kumacheva SS. Hierarchical Model of Corruption: Game-Theoretic Approach. In Trends in Mathematics. Springer Nature. 2021. p. 251-267. (Trends in Mathematics). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_14

Author

Orlov, Ivan M. ; Kumacheva, Suriya Sh. / Hierarchical Model of Corruption : Game-Theoretic Approach. Trends in Mathematics. Springer Nature, 2021. pp. 251-267 (Trends in Mathematics).

BibTeX

@inbook{9b83386b371449a3b13ce6d188cb6a9c,
title = "Hierarchical Model of Corruption: Game-Theoretic Approach",
abstract = "Corruption occurs in relations between people and companies—agents who, in order to benefit from it, should make strategic decisions. This condition makes it possible to use game-theoretic apparatus to analyze it and there are many scientific works on the topic yet they mostly address the corruption in form of game between two or maximum three players. This research differs in its approach: it broadens the scope and analyzes corrupt agents acting not isolated but as parts of a bigger hierarchical structure in hope to obtain insights that may help to combat corruption in organizations. A subhierarchical two-stage game-theoretic model of embezzlement and bribery is created, the particular example with six officials on three levels is solved via computer simulation, settings for corruption minimizing and mild corruption minimizing are suggested and the cooperative extension is suggested.",
keywords = "Bribery, Corruption, Corruption minimizing strategies, Embezzlement, Equilibria, Hierarchical game, Inspection",
author = "Orlov, {Ivan M.} and Kumacheva, {Suriya Sh}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.",
year = "2021",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_14",
language = "English",
series = "Trends in Mathematics",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
pages = "251--267",
booktitle = "Trends in Mathematics",
address = "Germany",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Hierarchical Model of Corruption

T2 - Game-Theoretic Approach

AU - Orlov, Ivan M.

AU - Kumacheva, Suriya Sh

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - Corruption occurs in relations between people and companies—agents who, in order to benefit from it, should make strategic decisions. This condition makes it possible to use game-theoretic apparatus to analyze it and there are many scientific works on the topic yet they mostly address the corruption in form of game between two or maximum three players. This research differs in its approach: it broadens the scope and analyzes corrupt agents acting not isolated but as parts of a bigger hierarchical structure in hope to obtain insights that may help to combat corruption in organizations. A subhierarchical two-stage game-theoretic model of embezzlement and bribery is created, the particular example with six officials on three levels is solved via computer simulation, settings for corruption minimizing and mild corruption minimizing are suggested and the cooperative extension is suggested.

AB - Corruption occurs in relations between people and companies—agents who, in order to benefit from it, should make strategic decisions. This condition makes it possible to use game-theoretic apparatus to analyze it and there are many scientific works on the topic yet they mostly address the corruption in form of game between two or maximum three players. This research differs in its approach: it broadens the scope and analyzes corrupt agents acting not isolated but as parts of a bigger hierarchical structure in hope to obtain insights that may help to combat corruption in organizations. A subhierarchical two-stage game-theoretic model of embezzlement and bribery is created, the particular example with six officials on three levels is solved via computer simulation, settings for corruption minimizing and mild corruption minimizing are suggested and the cooperative extension is suggested.

KW - Bribery

KW - Corruption

KW - Corruption minimizing strategies

KW - Embezzlement

KW - Equilibria

KW - Hierarchical game

KW - Inspection

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85126709823&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_14

DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_14

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85126709823

T3 - Trends in Mathematics

SP - 251

EP - 267

BT - Trends in Mathematics

PB - Springer Nature

ER -

ID: 95677386