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Dynamic stability of coalition formation in dynamic games. / Mazalov, Vladimir; Zhou, Jiangjing.

в: Operations Research Letters, Том 55, 107138, 01.07.2024.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование

Harvard

Mazalov, V & Zhou, J 2024, 'Dynamic stability of coalition formation in dynamic games', Operations Research Letters, Том. 55, 107138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2024.107138

APA

Mazalov, V., & Zhou, J. (2024). Dynamic stability of coalition formation in dynamic games. Operations Research Letters, 55, [107138]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2024.107138

Vancouver

Mazalov V, Zhou J. Dynamic stability of coalition formation in dynamic games. Operations Research Letters. 2024 Июль 1;55. 107138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2024.107138

Author

Mazalov, Vladimir ; Zhou, Jiangjing. / Dynamic stability of coalition formation in dynamic games. в: Operations Research Letters. 2024 ; Том 55.

BibTeX

@article{89402cf0d7364897a99418f0136db1ac,
title = "Dynamic stability of coalition formation in dynamic games",
abstract = "This paper explores the stability of coalition partitions in dynamic games, specifically introducing a concept of dynamically stable Nash coalition partition for dynamic games. We focus on a Nash equilibrium where coalitions act as unified players and discuss dynamic stability, where players have no incentive to switch coalitions. A case study on “fish wars” illustrates conditions under which dynamic stability occurs, utilizing a time-consistent imputation distribution procedure to allocate payoffs along optimal trajectories.",
keywords = "Dynamic game, Dynamically Nash stable coalition partition, Time-consistent IDP, Fish wars, Dynamic game, Dynamically Nash stable coalition partition, Fish wars, Time-consistent IDP",
author = "Vladimir Mazalov and Jiangjing Zhou",
year = "2024",
month = jul,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.orl.2024.107138",
language = "русский",
volume = "55",
journal = "Operations Research Letters",
issn = "0167-6377",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Dynamic stability of coalition formation in dynamic games

AU - Mazalov, Vladimir

AU - Zhou, Jiangjing

PY - 2024/7/1

Y1 - 2024/7/1

N2 - This paper explores the stability of coalition partitions in dynamic games, specifically introducing a concept of dynamically stable Nash coalition partition for dynamic games. We focus on a Nash equilibrium where coalitions act as unified players and discuss dynamic stability, where players have no incentive to switch coalitions. A case study on “fish wars” illustrates conditions under which dynamic stability occurs, utilizing a time-consistent imputation distribution procedure to allocate payoffs along optimal trajectories.

AB - This paper explores the stability of coalition partitions in dynamic games, specifically introducing a concept of dynamically stable Nash coalition partition for dynamic games. We focus on a Nash equilibrium where coalitions act as unified players and discuss dynamic stability, where players have no incentive to switch coalitions. A case study on “fish wars” illustrates conditions under which dynamic stability occurs, utilizing a time-consistent imputation distribution procedure to allocate payoffs along optimal trajectories.

KW - Dynamic game

KW - Dynamically Nash stable coalition partition

KW - Time-consistent IDP

KW - Fish wars

KW - Dynamic game

KW - Dynamically Nash stable coalition partition

KW - Fish wars

KW - Time-consistent IDP

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/84a81dfc-5e7e-3289-bcae-3032a5f10d03/

U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2024.107138

DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2024.107138

M3 - статья

VL - 55

JO - Operations Research Letters

JF - Operations Research Letters

SN - 0167-6377

M1 - 107138

ER -

ID: 127702973