Dynamic stability of coalition formation in dynamic games

Standard

Dynamic stability of coalition formation in dynamic games. / Mazalov, Vladimir ; Zhou, Jiangjing.

In: Operations Research Letters, Vol. 55, 107138, 01.07.2024.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

BibTeX

@article{89402cf0d7364897a99418f0136db1ac,

title = "Dynamic stability of coalition formation in dynamic games",

abstract = "This paper explores the stability of coalition partitions in dynamic games, specifically introducing a concept of dynamically stable Nash coalition partition for dynamic games. We focus on a Nash equilibrium where coalitions act as unified players and discuss dynamic stability, where players have no incentive to switch coalitions. A case study on “fish wars” illustrates conditions under which dynamic stability occurs, utilizing a time-consistent imputation distribution procedure to allocate payoffs along optimal trajectories.",

keywords = "Dynamic game, Dynamically Nash stable coalition partition, Time-consistent IDP, Fish wars, Dynamic game, Dynamically Nash stable coalition partition, Fish wars, Time-consistent IDP",

author = "Vladimir Mazalov and Jiangjing Zhou",

year = "2024",

month = jul,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.orl.2024.107138",

language = "русский",

volume = "55",

journal = "Operations Research Letters",

issn = "0167-6377",

publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Dynamic stability of coalition formation in dynamic games

AU - Mazalov, Vladimir

AU - Zhou, Jiangjing

PY - 2024/7/1

Y1 - 2024/7/1

N2 - This paper explores the stability of coalition partitions in dynamic games, specifically introducing a concept of dynamically stable Nash coalition partition for dynamic games. We focus on a Nash equilibrium where coalitions act as unified players and discuss dynamic stability, where players have no incentive to switch coalitions. A case study on “fish wars” illustrates conditions under which dynamic stability occurs, utilizing a time-consistent imputation distribution procedure to allocate payoffs along optimal trajectories.

AB - This paper explores the stability of coalition partitions in dynamic games, specifically introducing a concept of dynamically stable Nash coalition partition for dynamic games. We focus on a Nash equilibrium where coalitions act as unified players and discuss dynamic stability, where players have no incentive to switch coalitions. A case study on “fish wars” illustrates conditions under which dynamic stability occurs, utilizing a time-consistent imputation distribution procedure to allocate payoffs along optimal trajectories.

KW - Dynamic game

KW - Dynamically Nash stable coalition partition

KW - Time-consistent IDP

KW - Fish wars

KW - Dynamic game

KW - Dynamically Nash stable coalition partition

KW - Fish wars

KW - Time-consistent IDP

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/84a81dfc-5e7e-3289-bcae-3032a5f10d03/

U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2024.107138

DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2024.107138

M3 - статья

VL - 55

JO - Operations Research Letters

JF - Operations Research Letters

SN - 0167-6377

M1 - 107138

ER -

ID: 127702973