Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › глава/раздел › Рецензирование
Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains. / Zenkevich, Nikolay A.; Berezinets, Irina; Nikolchenko, Natalia; Rucheva, Alina.
Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2019. стр. 303-336 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › глава/раздел › Рецензирование
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TY - CHAP
T1 - Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains
AU - Zenkevich, Nikolay A.
AU - Berezinets, Irina
AU - Nikolchenko, Natalia
AU - Rucheva, Alina
N1 - Zenkevich, N. Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains / N. Zenkevich, I. Berezinets, N. Nikolchenko , A. Rucheva // Static and Dynamic Game Theory : Foundations and Applications. - Birkhäuser Verlag AG. - 2019. - P. 303-336. Publisher Copyright: © 2019, Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Copyright: Copyright 2019 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - The chapter revisits the supplier-retailer supply chain game and investigates target sales rebate and buyback contracts, which motivate participants for both individual rational and Pareto optimal behavior. The research considers the Stackelberg model in supply chain under condition of fixed retail price and stochastic demand. Authors proposed the algorithm of the conditionally coordinating problem solving for both types of contracts. A general framework is introduced, the condition for achieving the coordinating equilibrium is characterized, and a special case for uniformly distributed demand is analyzed. The models with uniformly distributed demand demonstrate that the conditional coordination can be achieved, and examples show that the problem of establishing contract parameters is a problem of sharing of supply chain expected profit under a compromise between supplier and retailer.
AB - The chapter revisits the supplier-retailer supply chain game and investigates target sales rebate and buyback contracts, which motivate participants for both individual rational and Pareto optimal behavior. The research considers the Stackelberg model in supply chain under condition of fixed retail price and stochastic demand. Authors proposed the algorithm of the conditionally coordinating problem solving for both types of contracts. A general framework is introduced, the condition for achieving the coordinating equilibrium is characterized, and a special case for uniformly distributed demand is analyzed. The models with uniformly distributed demand demonstrate that the conditional coordination can be achieved, and examples show that the problem of establishing contract parameters is a problem of sharing of supply chain expected profit under a compromise between supplier and retailer.
KW - Buyback contract
KW - Conditionally coordinating contracts
KW - Coordinating contracts
KW - Nash equilibrium
KW - Pareto-optimal solution
KW - Sales rebate contract
KW - Supply chain coordination
KW - РИНЦ
KW - SCOPUS
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85073217936&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_16
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_16
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85073217936
T3 - Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications
SP - 303
EP - 336
BT - Static and Dynamic Game Theory
PB - Birkhäuser Verlag AG
ER -
ID: 75326824