Standard

Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains. / Zenkevich, Nikolay A.; Berezinets, Irina; Nikolchenko, Natalia; Rucheva, Alina.

Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2019. p. 303-336 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Zenkevich, NA, Berezinets, I, Nikolchenko, N & Rucheva, A 2019, Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains. in Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications, Birkhäuser Verlag AG, pp. 303-336. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_16

APA

Zenkevich, N. A., Berezinets, I., Nikolchenko, N., & Rucheva, A. (2019). Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains. In Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications (pp. 303-336). (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). Birkhäuser Verlag AG. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_16

Vancouver

Zenkevich NA, Berezinets I, Nikolchenko N, Rucheva A. Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains. In Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Birkhäuser Verlag AG. 2019. p. 303-336. (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_16

Author

Zenkevich, Nikolay A. ; Berezinets, Irina ; Nikolchenko, Natalia ; Rucheva, Alina. / Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications. Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2019. pp. 303-336 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).

BibTeX

@inbook{d4de9664a4984638bfdba3919f196540,
title = "Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains",
abstract = "The chapter revisits the supplier-retailer supply chain game and investigates target sales rebate and buyback contracts, which motivate participants for both individual rational and Pareto optimal behavior. The research considers the Stackelberg model in supply chain under condition of fixed retail price and stochastic demand. Authors proposed the algorithm of the conditionally coordinating problem solving for both types of contracts. A general framework is introduced, the condition for achieving the coordinating equilibrium is characterized, and a special case for uniformly distributed demand is analyzed. The models with uniformly distributed demand demonstrate that the conditional coordination can be achieved, and examples show that the problem of establishing contract parameters is a problem of sharing of supply chain expected profit under a compromise between supplier and retailer.",
keywords = "Buyback contract, Conditionally coordinating contracts, Coordinating contracts, Nash equilibrium, Pareto-optimal solution, Sales rebate contract, Supply chain coordination, РИНЦ, SCOPUS",
author = "Zenkevich, {Nikolay A.} and Irina Berezinets and Natalia Nikolchenko and Alina Rucheva",
note = "Zenkevich, N. Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains / N. Zenkevich, I. Berezinets, N. Nikolchenko , A. Rucheva // Static and Dynamic Game Theory : Foundations and Applications. - Birkh{\"a}user Verlag AG. - 2019. - P. 303-336. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019, Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Copyright: Copyright 2019 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved. ",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_16",
language = "English",
series = "Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications",
publisher = "Birkh{\"a}user Verlag AG",
pages = "303--336",
booktitle = "Static and Dynamic Game Theory",
address = "Switzerland",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains

AU - Zenkevich, Nikolay A.

AU - Berezinets, Irina

AU - Nikolchenko, Natalia

AU - Rucheva, Alina

N1 - Zenkevich, N. Conditionally Coordinating Contracts in Supply Chains / N. Zenkevich, I. Berezinets, N. Nikolchenko , A. Rucheva // Static and Dynamic Game Theory : Foundations and Applications. - Birkhäuser Verlag AG. - 2019. - P. 303-336. Publisher Copyright: © 2019, Springer Nature Switzerland AG. Copyright: Copyright 2019 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - The chapter revisits the supplier-retailer supply chain game and investigates target sales rebate and buyback contracts, which motivate participants for both individual rational and Pareto optimal behavior. The research considers the Stackelberg model in supply chain under condition of fixed retail price and stochastic demand. Authors proposed the algorithm of the conditionally coordinating problem solving for both types of contracts. A general framework is introduced, the condition for achieving the coordinating equilibrium is characterized, and a special case for uniformly distributed demand is analyzed. The models with uniformly distributed demand demonstrate that the conditional coordination can be achieved, and examples show that the problem of establishing contract parameters is a problem of sharing of supply chain expected profit under a compromise between supplier and retailer.

AB - The chapter revisits the supplier-retailer supply chain game and investigates target sales rebate and buyback contracts, which motivate participants for both individual rational and Pareto optimal behavior. The research considers the Stackelberg model in supply chain under condition of fixed retail price and stochastic demand. Authors proposed the algorithm of the conditionally coordinating problem solving for both types of contracts. A general framework is introduced, the condition for achieving the coordinating equilibrium is characterized, and a special case for uniformly distributed demand is analyzed. The models with uniformly distributed demand demonstrate that the conditional coordination can be achieved, and examples show that the problem of establishing contract parameters is a problem of sharing of supply chain expected profit under a compromise between supplier and retailer.

KW - Buyback contract

KW - Conditionally coordinating contracts

KW - Coordinating contracts

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Pareto-optimal solution

KW - Sales rebate contract

KW - Supply chain coordination

KW - РИНЦ

KW - SCOPUS

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85073217936&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_16

DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_16

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85073217936

T3 - Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications

SP - 303

EP - 336

BT - Static and Dynamic Game Theory

PB - Birkhäuser Verlag AG

ER -

ID: 75326824