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A supplier–buyer bargaining model with asymmetric information and partial vertical integration. / Pishchulov, Grigory; Richter, Knut; Golesorkhi, Sougand.

Modelle und Methoden zur Entscheidungs­unterstützung für betriebs­wirtschaftliche Wertschöpfungs­prozesse. Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2016. стр. 117–137.

Результаты исследований: Публикации в книгах, отчётах, сборниках, трудах конференций › статья в сборнике › научная

Harvard

Pishchulov, G, Richter, K & Golesorkhi, S 2016, A supplier–buyer bargaining model with asymmetric information and partial vertical integration. в Modelle und Methoden zur Entscheidungs­unterstützung für betriebs­wirtschaftliche Wertschöpfungs­prozesse. Verlag Dr. Kovač, стр. 117–137. <http://www.verlagdrkovac.de/978-3-8300-9229-2.htm>

APA

Pishchulov, G., Richter, K., & Golesorkhi, S. (2016). A supplier–buyer bargaining model with asymmetric information and partial vertical integration. в Modelle und Methoden zur Entscheidungs­unterstützung für betriebs­wirtschaftliche Wertschöpfungs­prozesse (стр. 117–137). Verlag Dr. Kovač. http://www.verlagdrkovac.de/978-3-8300-9229-2.htm

Vancouver

Pishchulov G, Richter K, Golesorkhi S. A supplier–buyer bargaining model with asymmetric information and partial vertical integration. в Modelle und Methoden zur Entscheidungs­unterstützung für betriebs­wirtschaftliche Wertschöpfungs­prozesse. Verlag Dr. Kovač. 2016. стр. 117–137

Author

Pishchulov, Grigory ; Richter, Knut ; Golesorkhi, Sougand. / A supplier–buyer bargaining model with asymmetric information and partial vertical integration. Modelle und Methoden zur Entscheidungs­unterstützung für betriebs­wirtschaftliche Wertschöpfungs­prozesse. Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2016. стр. 117–137

BibTeX

@inbook{c6d58d3cf35e404d9afc782f83e4f9f2,
title = "A supplier–buyer bargaining model with asymmetric information and partial vertical integration",
abstract = "Most of the supply chain coordination models assume either independent firms engaging in a supply chain relationship or a vertically integrated supply chain structure with a common ownership. At the same time, management and organisation studies literature points to the existence of governance forms which involve shared ownership between the business partners — in particular, such forms where one supply chain member owns an equity share in the other. These governance forms can be described by the term partial vertical integration; to our best knowledge, they received little attention from the supply chain research. Literature suggests that a partial vertical integration may help the firms to ease contracting problems within a supply chain — in particular, by aligning firms{\textquoteright} incentives, and thus improve the total surplus. We address this proposition in the present work by studying a stylized model of a partially integrated supply chain in which the buyer holds an equity stake in the supplier. Assuming informat",
author = "Grigory Pishchulov and Knut Richter and Sougand Golesorkhi",
year = "2016",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-3-8300-9229-2",
pages = "117–137",
booktitle = "Modelle und Methoden zur Entscheidungs­unterst{\"u}tzung f{\"u}r betriebs­wirtschaftliche Wertsch{\"o}pfungs­prozesse",
publisher = "Verlag Dr. Kova{\v c}",
address = "Germany",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - A supplier–buyer bargaining model with asymmetric information and partial vertical integration

AU - Pishchulov, Grigory

AU - Richter, Knut

AU - Golesorkhi, Sougand

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - Most of the supply chain coordination models assume either independent firms engaging in a supply chain relationship or a vertically integrated supply chain structure with a common ownership. At the same time, management and organisation studies literature points to the existence of governance forms which involve shared ownership between the business partners — in particular, such forms where one supply chain member owns an equity share in the other. These governance forms can be described by the term partial vertical integration; to our best knowledge, they received little attention from the supply chain research. Literature suggests that a partial vertical integration may help the firms to ease contracting problems within a supply chain — in particular, by aligning firms’ incentives, and thus improve the total surplus. We address this proposition in the present work by studying a stylized model of a partially integrated supply chain in which the buyer holds an equity stake in the supplier. Assuming informat

AB - Most of the supply chain coordination models assume either independent firms engaging in a supply chain relationship or a vertically integrated supply chain structure with a common ownership. At the same time, management and organisation studies literature points to the existence of governance forms which involve shared ownership between the business partners — in particular, such forms where one supply chain member owns an equity share in the other. These governance forms can be described by the term partial vertical integration; to our best knowledge, they received little attention from the supply chain research. Literature suggests that a partial vertical integration may help the firms to ease contracting problems within a supply chain — in particular, by aligning firms’ incentives, and thus improve the total surplus. We address this proposition in the present work by studying a stylized model of a partially integrated supply chain in which the buyer holds an equity stake in the supplier. Assuming informat

M3 - Article in an anthology

SN - 978-3-8300-9229-2

SP - 117

EP - 137

BT - Modelle und Methoden zur Entscheidungs­unterstützung für betriebs­wirtschaftliche Wertschöpfungs­prozesse

PB - Verlag Dr. Kovač

ER -

ID: 7612943