A supplier–buyer bargaining model with asymmetric information and partial vertical integration. / Pishchulov, Grigory; Richter, Knut; Golesorkhi, Sougand.
Modelle und Methoden zur Entscheidungsunterstützung für betriebswirtschaftliche Wertschöpfungsprozesse. Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2016. p. 117–137.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Article in an anthology › Research
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TY - CHAP
T1 - A supplier–buyer bargaining model with asymmetric information and partial vertical integration
AU - Pishchulov, Grigory
AU - Richter, Knut
AU - Golesorkhi, Sougand
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - Most of the supply chain coordination models assume either independent firms engaging in a supply chain relationship or a vertically integrated supply chain structure with a common ownership. At the same time, management and organisation studies literature points to the existence of governance forms which involve shared ownership between the business partners — in particular, such forms where one supply chain member owns an equity share in the other. These governance forms can be described by the term partial vertical integration; to our best knowledge, they received little attention from the supply chain research. Literature suggests that a partial vertical integration may help the firms to ease contracting problems within a supply chain — in particular, by aligning firms’ incentives, and thus improve the total surplus. We address this proposition in the present work by studying a stylized model of a partially integrated supply chain in which the buyer holds an equity stake in the supplier. Assuming informat
AB - Most of the supply chain coordination models assume either independent firms engaging in a supply chain relationship or a vertically integrated supply chain structure with a common ownership. At the same time, management and organisation studies literature points to the existence of governance forms which involve shared ownership between the business partners — in particular, such forms where one supply chain member owns an equity share in the other. These governance forms can be described by the term partial vertical integration; to our best knowledge, they received little attention from the supply chain research. Literature suggests that a partial vertical integration may help the firms to ease contracting problems within a supply chain — in particular, by aligning firms’ incentives, and thus improve the total surplus. We address this proposition in the present work by studying a stylized model of a partially integrated supply chain in which the buyer holds an equity stake in the supplier. Assuming informat
M3 - Article in an anthology
SN - 978-3-8300-9229-2
SP - 117
EP - 137
BT - Modelle und Methoden zur Entscheidungsunterstützung für betriebswirtschaftliche Wertschöpfungsprozesse
PB - Verlag Dr. Kovač
ER -
ID: 7612943