TY - GEN

T1 - A Reinforcement Protection Game in the Internet of Things

AU - GARNAEV, ANDREY

AU - Trappe, W.

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - The vast scale of the Internet of Things (IoT), combined with its heterogeneous nature involving many different types of devices and machines, could lead the IoT to be vulnerable to a variety of security threats and malicious attacks. Addressing the broad array of threats requires that different security mechanisms are deployed at appropriate locations within the broader IoT communication network. In this paper, we examine this problem by applying a resource allocation approach involving a game-theoretical framework to model: (a) an attack aimed to maximize total damage to the network, and (b) an attack aimed to compromise at least one of the devices. To evaluate the probability of a successful attack we apply a contest success function, and found the associated equilibrium strategies in closed form. Additionally, we note an interesting relationship between equilibrium strategies in security reinforcement games and OFDM transmission games under hostile jamming. A criteria is designed that allows one to determine whether an IoT controller’s resources is sufficient to protect all of the IoT devices it manages.

AB - The vast scale of the Internet of Things (IoT), combined with its heterogeneous nature involving many different types of devices and machines, could lead the IoT to be vulnerable to a variety of security threats and malicious attacks. Addressing the broad array of threats requires that different security mechanisms are deployed at appropriate locations within the broader IoT communication network. In this paper, we examine this problem by applying a resource allocation approach involving a game-theoretical framework to model: (a) an attack aimed to maximize total damage to the network, and (b) an attack aimed to compromise at least one of the devices. To evaluate the probability of a successful attack we apply a contest success function, and found the associated equilibrium strategies in closed form. Additionally, we note an interesting relationship between equilibrium strategies in security reinforcement games and OFDM transmission games under hostile jamming. A criteria is designed that allows one to determine whether an IoT controller’s resources is sufficient to protect all of the IoT devices it manages.

KW - Compromised devices

KW - IoT

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Security

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85051076665&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.mendeley.com/research/reinforcement-protection-game-internet-things

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-93797-7_11

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-93797-7_11

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 9783319937960

VL - 242

T3 - Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST

SP - 85

EP - 95

BT - Interoperability, Safety and Security in IoT - Third International Conference, InterIoT 2017, and Fourth International Conference, SaSeIot 2017, Proceedings

A2 - Palau, Carlos E.

A2 - Cuppens, Nora

A2 - Cuppens, Frederic

A2 - Gabillon, Alban

A2 - Fortino, Giancarlo

A2 - Guerrieri, Antonio

A2 - Chaouchi, Hakima

PB - Springer Nature

ER -