Standard
A Reinforcement Protection Game in the Internet of Things. / GARNAEV, ANDREY; Trappe, W.
Interoperability, Safety and Security in IoT - Third International Conference, InterIoT 2017, and Fourth International Conference, SaSeIot 2017, Proceedings. ed. / Carlos E. Palau; Nora Cuppens; Frederic Cuppens; Alban Gabillon; Giancarlo Fortino; Antonio Guerrieri; Hakima Chaouchi. Vol. 242 Springer Nature, 2018. p. 85-95 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST; Vol. 242).
Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › Research › peer-review
Harvard
GARNAEV, ANDREY & Trappe, W 2018,
A Reinforcement Protection Game in the Internet of Things. in CE Palau, N Cuppens, F Cuppens, A Gabillon, G Fortino, A Guerrieri & H Chaouchi (eds),
Interoperability, Safety and Security in IoT - Third International Conference, InterIoT 2017, and Fourth International Conference, SaSeIot 2017, Proceedings. vol. 242, Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST, vol. 242, Springer Nature, pp. 85-95.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93797-7_11
APA
GARNAEV, ANDREY., & Trappe, W. (2018).
A Reinforcement Protection Game in the Internet of Things. In C. E. Palau, N. Cuppens, F. Cuppens, A. Gabillon, G. Fortino, A. Guerrieri, & H. Chaouchi (Eds.),
Interoperability, Safety and Security in IoT - Third International Conference, InterIoT 2017, and Fourth International Conference, SaSeIot 2017, Proceedings (Vol. 242, pp. 85-95). (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST; Vol. 242). Springer Nature.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93797-7_11
Vancouver
GARNAEV ANDREY, Trappe W.
A Reinforcement Protection Game in the Internet of Things. In Palau CE, Cuppens N, Cuppens F, Gabillon A, Fortino G, Guerrieri A, Chaouchi H, editors, Interoperability, Safety and Security in IoT - Third International Conference, InterIoT 2017, and Fourth International Conference, SaSeIot 2017, Proceedings. Vol. 242. Springer Nature. 2018. p. 85-95. (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST).
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93797-7_11
Author
GARNAEV, ANDREY ; Trappe, W. /
A Reinforcement Protection Game in the Internet of Things. Interoperability, Safety and Security in IoT - Third International Conference, InterIoT 2017, and Fourth International Conference, SaSeIot 2017, Proceedings. editor / Carlos E. Palau ; Nora Cuppens ; Frederic Cuppens ; Alban Gabillon ; Giancarlo Fortino ; Antonio Guerrieri ; Hakima Chaouchi. Vol. 242 Springer Nature, 2018. pp. 85-95 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST).
BibTeX
@inproceedings{34968ea9d23c4fcf90c4e67a5cd140c5,
title = "A Reinforcement Protection Game in the Internet of Things",
abstract = "The vast scale of the Internet of Things (IoT), combined with its heterogeneous nature involving many different types of devices and machines, could lead the IoT to be vulnerable to a variety of security threats and malicious attacks. Addressing the broad array of threats requires that different security mechanisms are deployed at appropriate locations within the broader IoT communication network. In this paper, we examine this problem by applying a resource allocation approach involving a game-theoretical framework to model: (a) an attack aimed to maximize total damage to the network, and (b) an attack aimed to compromise at least one of the devices. To evaluate the probability of a successful attack we apply a contest success function, and found the associated equilibrium strategies in closed form. Additionally, we note an interesting relationship between equilibrium strategies in security reinforcement games and OFDM transmission games under hostile jamming. A criteria is designed that allows one to determine whether an IoT controller{\textquoteright}s resources is sufficient to protect all of the IoT devices it manages.",
keywords = "Compromised devices, IoT, Nash equilibrium, Security",
author = "ANDREY GARNAEV and W. Trappe",
year = "2018",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-93797-7_11",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783319937960",
volume = "242",
series = "Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
pages = " 85--95",
editor = "Palau, {Carlos E.} and Nora Cuppens and Frederic Cuppens and Alban Gabillon and Giancarlo Fortino and Antonio Guerrieri and Hakima Chaouchi",
booktitle = "Interoperability, Safety and Security in IoT - Third International Conference, InterIoT 2017, and Fourth International Conference, SaSeIot 2017, Proceedings",
address = "Germany",
}
RIS
TY - GEN
T1 - A Reinforcement Protection Game in the Internet of Things
AU - GARNAEV, ANDREY
AU - Trappe, W.
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - The vast scale of the Internet of Things (IoT), combined with its heterogeneous nature involving many different types of devices and machines, could lead the IoT to be vulnerable to a variety of security threats and malicious attacks. Addressing the broad array of threats requires that different security mechanisms are deployed at appropriate locations within the broader IoT communication network. In this paper, we examine this problem by applying a resource allocation approach involving a game-theoretical framework to model: (a) an attack aimed to maximize total damage to the network, and (b) an attack aimed to compromise at least one of the devices. To evaluate the probability of a successful attack we apply a contest success function, and found the associated equilibrium strategies in closed form. Additionally, we note an interesting relationship between equilibrium strategies in security reinforcement games and OFDM transmission games under hostile jamming. A criteria is designed that allows one to determine whether an IoT controller’s resources is sufficient to protect all of the IoT devices it manages.
AB - The vast scale of the Internet of Things (IoT), combined with its heterogeneous nature involving many different types of devices and machines, could lead the IoT to be vulnerable to a variety of security threats and malicious attacks. Addressing the broad array of threats requires that different security mechanisms are deployed at appropriate locations within the broader IoT communication network. In this paper, we examine this problem by applying a resource allocation approach involving a game-theoretical framework to model: (a) an attack aimed to maximize total damage to the network, and (b) an attack aimed to compromise at least one of the devices. To evaluate the probability of a successful attack we apply a contest success function, and found the associated equilibrium strategies in closed form. Additionally, we note an interesting relationship between equilibrium strategies in security reinforcement games and OFDM transmission games under hostile jamming. A criteria is designed that allows one to determine whether an IoT controller’s resources is sufficient to protect all of the IoT devices it manages.
KW - Compromised devices
KW - IoT
KW - Nash equilibrium
KW - Security
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85051076665&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.mendeley.com/research/reinforcement-protection-game-internet-things
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-93797-7_11
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-93797-7_11
M3 - Conference contribution
SN - 9783319937960
VL - 242
T3 - Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST
SP - 85
EP - 95
BT - Interoperability, Safety and Security in IoT - Third International Conference, InterIoT 2017, and Fourth International Conference, SaSeIot 2017, Proceedings
A2 - Palau, Carlos E.
A2 - Cuppens, Nora
A2 - Cuppens, Frederic
A2 - Gabillon, Alban
A2 - Fortino, Giancarlo
A2 - Guerrieri, Antonio
A2 - Chaouchi, Hakima
PB - Springer Nature
ER -
