Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
Эффективное наказание в дилемме заключенного для n лиц на сети. / Гриних, Александра Леонидовна; Петросян, Леон Аганесович.
в: ТРУДЫ ИНСТИТУТА МАТЕМАТИКИ И МЕХАНИКИ УРО РАН, Том 27, № 3, 01.09.2021, стр. 256-262.Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Эффективное наказание в дилемме заключенного для n лиц на сети
AU - Гриних, Александра Леонидовна
AU - Петросян, Леон Аганесович
N1 - Funding Information: 1The research was supported by the Russian Science Foundation, the grant “Optimal Behavior in Conflict-Controlled Systems” (project no. 17-11-01079). Publisher Copyright: © 2021 The authors.
PY - 2021/9/1
Y1 - 2021/9/1
N2 - The paper considers an n-person prisoner's dilemma game. We present a modification of this model for the network interaction of players. A set of grim trigger strategies is a Nash equilibrium in the repeated n-person prisoner's dilemma on a network, just as in the two-player game. However, even a slight deviation leads to the case where players get low payoffs in perpetuity without the possibility of returning to the Pareto optimal payoffs. A solution to this problem is proposed. The players' payoff functions in a game of an n-person prisoner's dilemma type on a network are described. A strategy involving a punishment on a limited interval of the game is proposed. The number of steps required for an effective punishment is found. An example of a network for this game is given. The number of steps for an effective punishment is found for the given example.
AB - The paper considers an n-person prisoner's dilemma game. We present a modification of this model for the network interaction of players. A set of grim trigger strategies is a Nash equilibrium in the repeated n-person prisoner's dilemma on a network, just as in the two-player game. However, even a slight deviation leads to the case where players get low payoffs in perpetuity without the possibility of returning to the Pareto optimal payoffs. A solution to this problem is proposed. The players' payoff functions in a game of an n-person prisoner's dilemma type on a network are described. A strategy involving a punishment on a limited interval of the game is proposed. The number of steps required for an effective punishment is found. An example of a network for this game is given. The number of steps for an effective punishment is found for the given example.
KW - Effective punishment
KW - Network game
KW - Prisoner's dilemma
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85123582639&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/74a45abc-01af-31d0-9752-69b7d61e78da/
U2 - 10.21538/0134-4889-2021-27-3-256-262
DO - 10.21538/0134-4889-2021-27-3-256-262
M3 - статья
AN - SCOPUS:85123582639
VL - 27
SP - 256
EP - 262
JO - ТРУДЫ ИНСТИТУТА МАТЕМАТИКИ И МЕХАНИКИ УРО РАН
JF - ТРУДЫ ИНСТИТУТА МАТЕМАТИКИ И МЕХАНИКИ УРО РАН
SN - 0134-4889
IS - 3
ER -
ID: 87567592