Stochastic Data Transmission Model with Uncertainty on Dropper's Appearance.

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Stochastic Data Transmission Model with Uncertainty on Dropper's Appearance. / Xue, Juan.

In: Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Vol. 13, 2020, p. 427-440.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

Author

Xue, Juan. / Stochastic Data Transmission Model with Uncertainty on Dropper's Appearance. In: Contributions to Game Theory and Management. 2020 ; Vol. 13. pp. 427-440.

BibTeX

@article{3ed7caf10aca4dddabcb8862a98bcbc7,

title = "Stochastic Data Transmission Model with Uncertainty on Dropper's Appearance.",

abstract = "We consider a stochastic dynamic game with uncertainty about appearance of an dropper in infinite time horizon. For the lack of information about whether the dropper is present or not, two different states of nature can appear with some given probabilities at each stage. We study the non-cooperative behavior of players, and Nash equilibrium is considered as an equilibrium concept. We investigate how limited information about the dropper's appearance impacts the anti-jamming strategy.",

keywords = "nash equilibrium, secrecy, stochastic game, throughput, nash equilibrium, secrecy, stochastic game, throughput",

author = "Juan Xue",

year = "2020",

language = "English",

volume = "13",

pages = "427--440",

journal = "Contributions to Game Theory and Management",

issn = "2310-2608",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Stochastic Data Transmission Model with Uncertainty on Dropper's Appearance.

AU - Xue, Juan

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - We consider a stochastic dynamic game with uncertainty about appearance of an dropper in infinite time horizon. For the lack of information about whether the dropper is present or not, two different states of nature can appear with some given probabilities at each stage. We study the non-cooperative behavior of players, and Nash equilibrium is considered as an equilibrium concept. We investigate how limited information about the dropper's appearance impacts the anti-jamming strategy.

AB - We consider a stochastic dynamic game with uncertainty about appearance of an dropper in infinite time horizon. For the lack of information about whether the dropper is present or not, two different states of nature can appear with some given probabilities at each stage. We study the non-cooperative behavior of players, and Nash equilibrium is considered as an equilibrium concept. We investigate how limited information about the dropper's appearance impacts the anti-jamming strategy.

KW - nash equilibrium

KW - secrecy

KW - stochastic game

KW - throughput

KW - nash equilibrium

KW - secrecy

KW - stochastic game

KW - throughput

M3 - Article

VL - 13

SP - 427

EP - 440

JO - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

JF - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

SN - 2310-2608

ER -

ID: 78576739