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Security Games With Unknown Adversarial Strategies. / Garnaev, A.; Baykal-Gursoy, M.; Poor, H.V.

In: IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, Vol. 46, 2016, p. 2291 -2299.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Garnaev, A, Baykal-Gursoy, M & Poor, HV 2016, 'Security Games With Unknown Adversarial Strategies', IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, vol. 46, pp. 2291 -2299. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCYB.2015.2475243

APA

Garnaev, A., Baykal-Gursoy, M., & Poor, H. V. (2016). Security Games With Unknown Adversarial Strategies. IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics, 46, 2291 -2299. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCYB.2015.2475243

Vancouver

Garnaev A, Baykal-Gursoy M, Poor HV. Security Games With Unknown Adversarial Strategies. IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics. 2016;46:2291 -2299. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCYB.2015.2475243

Author

Garnaev, A. ; Baykal-Gursoy, M. ; Poor, H.V. / Security Games With Unknown Adversarial Strategies. In: IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics. 2016 ; Vol. 46. pp. 2291 -2299.

BibTeX

@article{bb093101938c4fe69596671bb6cefcb8,
title = "Security Games With Unknown Adversarial Strategies",
abstract = "The security community has witnessed a significant increase in the number of different types of security threats. This situation calls for the design of new techniques that can be incorporated into security protocols to meet these challenges successfully. An important tool for developing new security protocols as well as estimating their effectiveness is game theory. This game theory framework usually involves two players or agents: 1) a protector and 2) an adversary, and two patterns of agent behavior are considered: 1) selfish behavior, where each of the agents wants to maximize his payoff; and 2) leader and follower behavior, where one agent (the leader) expects that the other agent (the follower) will respond to the leader{\textquoteright}s strategy. Such an approach assumes that the agents agree on which strategy to apply in advance. In this paper, this strong assumption is relaxed. Namely, the following question is considered: what happens if it is unknown a priori what pattern of behavior the adversary is going to use",
author = "A. Garnaev and M. Baykal-Gursoy and H.V. Poor",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1109/TCYB.2015.2475243",
language = "English",
volume = "46",
pages = "2291 --2299",
journal = "IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics",
issn = "2168-2267",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Security Games With Unknown Adversarial Strategies

AU - Garnaev, A.

AU - Baykal-Gursoy, M.

AU - Poor, H.V.

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - The security community has witnessed a significant increase in the number of different types of security threats. This situation calls for the design of new techniques that can be incorporated into security protocols to meet these challenges successfully. An important tool for developing new security protocols as well as estimating their effectiveness is game theory. This game theory framework usually involves two players or agents: 1) a protector and 2) an adversary, and two patterns of agent behavior are considered: 1) selfish behavior, where each of the agents wants to maximize his payoff; and 2) leader and follower behavior, where one agent (the leader) expects that the other agent (the follower) will respond to the leader’s strategy. Such an approach assumes that the agents agree on which strategy to apply in advance. In this paper, this strong assumption is relaxed. Namely, the following question is considered: what happens if it is unknown a priori what pattern of behavior the adversary is going to use

AB - The security community has witnessed a significant increase in the number of different types of security threats. This situation calls for the design of new techniques that can be incorporated into security protocols to meet these challenges successfully. An important tool for developing new security protocols as well as estimating their effectiveness is game theory. This game theory framework usually involves two players or agents: 1) a protector and 2) an adversary, and two patterns of agent behavior are considered: 1) selfish behavior, where each of the agents wants to maximize his payoff; and 2) leader and follower behavior, where one agent (the leader) expects that the other agent (the follower) will respond to the leader’s strategy. Such an approach assumes that the agents agree on which strategy to apply in advance. In this paper, this strong assumption is relaxed. Namely, the following question is considered: what happens if it is unknown a priori what pattern of behavior the adversary is going to use

U2 - 10.1109/TCYB.2015.2475243

DO - 10.1109/TCYB.2015.2475243

M3 - Article

VL - 46

SP - 2291

EP - 2299

JO - IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics

JF - IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics

SN - 2168-2267

ER -

ID: 5813047