In this paper we discuss on the general level the issue of trust the voters put in the secret voting system used in political elections. We promote the point of view that the voters’ recognition and acceptance of a particular voting system should be based not on trust, but on knowledge—on the knowledge of what is really happening during the voting, not presumed. The starting point of knowledge is mistrust. We formulate a postulate of mistrust (of an election commission) and keeping it in mind look closely at several deployed voting systems including the Estonian one. We find all of them unacceptable. Then we formulate three criteria for an Internet voting system to be acceptable to the voters (civil society). These are (1) openness, (2) acceptance of the system by an uncertain and broad set of qualified examiners and (3) a verifiable access of unsophisticated voters to the voter’s software approved by the aforementioned set of examiners. Finally, we explain only the modest role of the official (government) certification of the voting system in its recognition by the voters (civil society).