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Patrolling games on a lattice network. / Лю, Цзяжуй; Мазалов, Владимир Викторович.

In: ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. СЕРИЯ 10: ПРИКЛАДНАЯ МАТЕМАТИКА, ИНФОРМАТИКА, ПРОЦЕССЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ, Vol. 22, No. 2, 04.08.2026, p. 237-250.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Harvard

Лю, Ц & Мазалов, ВВ 2026, 'Patrolling games on a lattice network', ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. СЕРИЯ 10: ПРИКЛАДНАЯ МАТЕМАТИКА, ИНФОРМАТИКА, ПРОЦЕССЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 237-250. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu10.2026.205

APA

Лю, Ц., & Мазалов, В. В. (2026). Patrolling games on a lattice network. ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. СЕРИЯ 10: ПРИКЛАДНАЯ МАТЕМАТИКА, ИНФОРМАТИКА, ПРОЦЕССЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ, 22(2), 237-250. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu10.2026.205

Vancouver

Лю Ц, Мазалов ВВ. Patrolling games on a lattice network. ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. СЕРИЯ 10: ПРИКЛАДНАЯ МАТЕМАТИКА, ИНФОРМАТИКА, ПРОЦЕССЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ. 2026 Aug 4;22(2):237-250. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu10.2026.205

Author

Лю, Цзяжуй ; Мазалов, Владимир Викторович. / Patrolling games on a lattice network. In: ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. СЕРИЯ 10: ПРИКЛАДНАЯ МАТЕМАТИКА, ИНФОРМАТИКА, ПРОЦЕССЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ. 2026 ; Vol. 22, No. 2. pp. 237-250.

BibTeX

@article{adb5d3d16c824f8da30c0a6712cb294c,
title = "Patrolling games on a lattice network",
abstract = "A two-player zero-sum game is considered, where one player (the patroller) chooses a route to patrol an object that is a lattice graph. The other player (the hider) chooses a vertex of the graph to attack, with the goal of remaining undetected for a certain time T. The patroller wins if, during the time T, its route passes through the vertex chosen by the other player. The equilibrium in this game is derived in the class of mixed strategies.",
keywords = "Nash equilibrium, hamilton cycle, hider, lattice, network, patroller, patrolling game, zero-sum game",
author = "Цзяжуй Лю and Мазалов, {Владимир Викторович}",
year = "2026",
month = aug,
day = "4",
doi = "10.21638/spbu10.2026.205",
language = "English",
volume = "22",
pages = "237--250",
journal = " ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. ПРИКЛАДНАЯ МАТЕМАТИКА. ИНФОРМАТИКА. ПРОЦЕССЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ",
issn = "1811-9905",
publisher = "Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Patrolling games on a lattice network

AU - Лю, Цзяжуй

AU - Мазалов, Владимир Викторович

PY - 2026/8/4

Y1 - 2026/8/4

N2 - A two-player zero-sum game is considered, where one player (the patroller) chooses a route to patrol an object that is a lattice graph. The other player (the hider) chooses a vertex of the graph to attack, with the goal of remaining undetected for a certain time T. The patroller wins if, during the time T, its route passes through the vertex chosen by the other player. The equilibrium in this game is derived in the class of mixed strategies.

AB - A two-player zero-sum game is considered, where one player (the patroller) chooses a route to patrol an object that is a lattice graph. The other player (the hider) chooses a vertex of the graph to attack, with the goal of remaining undetected for a certain time T. The patroller wins if, during the time T, its route passes through the vertex chosen by the other player. The equilibrium in this game is derived in the class of mixed strategies.

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - hamilton cycle

KW - hider

KW - lattice

KW - network

KW - patroller

KW - patrolling game

KW - zero-sum game

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/02c1e894-15aa-3b9b-a975-e142ae8dd1a4/

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105046874064

UR - https://www.elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=91925915

U2 - 10.21638/spbu10.2026.205

DO - 10.21638/spbu10.2026.205

M3 - Article

VL - 22

SP - 237

EP - 250

JO - ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. ПРИКЛАДНАЯ МАТЕМАТИКА. ИНФОРМАТИКА. ПРОЦЕССЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ

JF - ВЕСТНИК САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГСКОГО УНИВЕРСИТЕТА. ПРИКЛАДНАЯ МАТЕМАТИКА. ИНФОРМАТИКА. ПРОЦЕССЫ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ

SN - 1811-9905

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 159175921