Standard

A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs. / Kuzyutin, Denis; Pankratova, Yaroslavna; Svetlov, Roman.

Frontiers of Dynamic Games. ed. / Leon A. Petrosyan; Vladimir V. Mazalov; Nikolay A. Zenkevich. Cham : Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2019. p. 85-102 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Kuzyutin, D, Pankratova, Y & Svetlov, R 2019, A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs. in LA Petrosyan, VV Mazalov & NA Zenkevich (eds), Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications, Birkhäuser Verlag AG, Cham, pp. 85-102. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_6

APA

Kuzyutin, D., Pankratova, Y., & Svetlov, R. (2019). A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs. In L. A. Petrosyan, V. V. Mazalov, & N. A. Zenkevich (Eds.), Frontiers of Dynamic Games (pp. 85-102). (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). Birkhäuser Verlag AG. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_6

Vancouver

Kuzyutin D, Pankratova Y, Svetlov R. A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs. In Petrosyan LA, Mazalov VV, Zenkevich NA, editors, Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Cham: Birkhäuser Verlag AG. 2019. p. 85-102. (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_6

Author

Kuzyutin, Denis ; Pankratova, Yaroslavna ; Svetlov, Roman. / A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs. Frontiers of Dynamic Games. editor / Leon A. Petrosyan ; Vladimir V. Mazalov ; Nikolay A. Zenkevich. Cham : Birkhäuser Verlag AG, 2019. pp. 85-102 (Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).

BibTeX

@inbook{c9e91d2f7e93413fa8e0d9c29d1c62e4,
title = "A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs",
abstract = "We deal with multistage multicriteria games in extensive form and employ so-called “A-subgame” concept to examine dynamical properties of some non-cooperative and cooperative solutions. It is proved that if we take into account only the active players at each A-subgame the set of all strong Pareto equilibria is time consistent but does not satisfy dynamical compatibility. We construct an optimal cooperative trajectory and vector-valued characteristic function using the refined leximin algorithm. To ensure the sustainability of a cooperative agreement we design the A-incremental imputation distribution procedure for the Shapley value which provides a better incentive for cooperation than classical incremental allocation procedure. This specific payment schedule corresponds to the A-subgame concept satisfies time consistency and efficiency condition and implies non-zero current payment to the active player immediately after her move.",
keywords = "Cooperative solution, Dynamic game, Multicriteria game, Multiple criteria decision making, Pareto equilibria, Shapley value, Time consistency",
author = "Denis Kuzyutin and Yaroslavna Pankratova and Roman Svetlov",
note = "Kuzyutin D., Pankratova Y., Svetlov R. (2019) A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs. In: Petrosyan L., Mazalov V., Zenkevich N. (eds) Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkh{\"a}user, Cham",
year = "2019",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_6",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783030236984",
series = "Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications",
publisher = "Birkh{\"a}user Verlag AG",
pages = "85--102",
editor = "Petrosyan, {Leon A. } and Mazalov, {Vladimir V. } and Zenkevich, {Nikolay A. }",
booktitle = "Frontiers of Dynamic Games",
address = "Switzerland",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs

AU - Kuzyutin, Denis

AU - Pankratova, Yaroslavna

AU - Svetlov, Roman

N1 - Kuzyutin D., Pankratova Y., Svetlov R. (2019) A-Subgame Concept and the Solutions Properties for Multistage Games with Vector Payoffs. In: Petrosyan L., Mazalov V., Zenkevich N. (eds) Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkhäuser, Cham

PY - 2019

Y1 - 2019

N2 - We deal with multistage multicriteria games in extensive form and employ so-called “A-subgame” concept to examine dynamical properties of some non-cooperative and cooperative solutions. It is proved that if we take into account only the active players at each A-subgame the set of all strong Pareto equilibria is time consistent but does not satisfy dynamical compatibility. We construct an optimal cooperative trajectory and vector-valued characteristic function using the refined leximin algorithm. To ensure the sustainability of a cooperative agreement we design the A-incremental imputation distribution procedure for the Shapley value which provides a better incentive for cooperation than classical incremental allocation procedure. This specific payment schedule corresponds to the A-subgame concept satisfies time consistency and efficiency condition and implies non-zero current payment to the active player immediately after her move.

AB - We deal with multistage multicriteria games in extensive form and employ so-called “A-subgame” concept to examine dynamical properties of some non-cooperative and cooperative solutions. It is proved that if we take into account only the active players at each A-subgame the set of all strong Pareto equilibria is time consistent but does not satisfy dynamical compatibility. We construct an optimal cooperative trajectory and vector-valued characteristic function using the refined leximin algorithm. To ensure the sustainability of a cooperative agreement we design the A-incremental imputation distribution procedure for the Shapley value which provides a better incentive for cooperation than classical incremental allocation procedure. This specific payment schedule corresponds to the A-subgame concept satisfies time consistency and efficiency condition and implies non-zero current payment to the active player immediately after her move.

KW - Cooperative solution

KW - Dynamic game

KW - Multicriteria game

KW - Multiple criteria decision making

KW - Pareto equilibria

KW - Shapley value

KW - Time consistency

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85073194695&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_6

DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_6

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:85073194695

SN - 9783030236984

T3 - Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications

SP - 85

EP - 102

BT - Frontiers of Dynamic Games

A2 - Petrosyan, Leon A.

A2 - Mazalov, Vladimir V.

A2 - Zenkevich, Nikolay A.

PB - Birkhäuser Verlag AG

CY - Cham

ER -

ID: 47705383