Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Research › peer-review
We deal with multistage multicriteria games in extensive form and employ so-called “A-subgame” concept to examine dynamical properties of some non-cooperative and cooperative solutions. It is proved that if we take into account only the active players at each A-subgame the set of all strong Pareto equilibria is time consistent but does not satisfy dynamical compatibility. We construct an optimal cooperative trajectory and vector-valued characteristic function using the refined leximin algorithm. To ensure the sustainability of a cooperative agreement we design the A-incremental imputation distribution procedure for the Shapley value which provides a better incentive for cooperation than classical incremental allocation procedure. This specific payment schedule corresponds to the A-subgame concept satisfies time consistency and efficiency condition and implies non-zero current payment to the active player immediately after her move.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Frontiers of Dynamic Games |
Editors | Leon A. Petrosyan, Vladimir V. Mazalov, Nikolay A. Zenkevich |
Place of Publication | Cham |
Publisher | Birkhäuser Verlag AG |
Pages | 85-102 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9783030236991 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783030236984 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2019 |
Name | Static and Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications |
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ISSN (Print) | 2363-8516 |
ISSN (Electronic) | 2363-8524 |
ID: 47705383