We derive a non-cooperative and cooperative strategies and state trajectories for a finite-horizon multistage game of renewable resource extraction with asymmetric players. Assuming transferable utility we extend the subgame perfect core concept introduced for extensive-form games to the class of n-person multistage games and specify an algorithm for choosing a unique payoff distribution procedure from the core in a two-player game. This quasi proportional payment schedule satisfies several good properties and could be applied to implement a cooperative solution based on the maximization of the relative benefit from cooperation (or the value of cooperation). We provide a numerical example to demonstrate the properties of the obtained solutions and the algorithm implementation.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationMathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research
Subtitle of host publication21st International Conference, MOTOR 2022, Proceedings
EditorsPanos Pardalos, Michael Khachay, Vladimir Mazalov
PublisherSpringer Nature
Pages235-249
Number of pages15
ISBN (Print)9783031096068
DOIs
StatePublished - 2022
Event21st International Conference on Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research, MOTOR 2022 - Petrozavodsk, Russian Federation
Duration: 2 Jul 20226 Jul 2022

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume13367
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference21st International Conference on Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research, MOTOR 2022
Country/TerritoryRussian Federation
CityPetrozavodsk
Period2/07/226/07/22

    Research areas

  • Cooperative solution, Fishery-management model, Multistage game, Payoff distribution procedure, Renewable resource extraction, Subgame-perfect equilibrium

    Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

ID: 99997815