The principle of presuppositionlessness is invariably associated with phenomenology as its essential feature. At the same time, E. Husserl himself introduces this principle using the words “as it has already been repeatedly emphasized”, indicating that the requirement of presuppositionlessness is not his innovation. Looking at the history of the issue, we find that Husserl’s closest predecessor, who thematized freedom from presuppositions, and almost in the same formulations, is H. Rickert. A comparison between the principle of presuppositionlessness by the two thinkers makes it possible not only to see more clearly Husserl’s rootedness in the tradition of thought, but also to more vividly express what was newly introduced by phenomenology and what really sets it apart from all previous thinking. As a result of this comparison, we find that the radical innovation of phenomenology itself is neither a tendency towards presuppositionlessness and apodicticism of knowledge, nor an appeal to the theory of knowledge
Original languageRussian
Pages (from-to)19
JournalЭлектронный научно-методический журнал Омского ГАУ
Issue numberS6
StatePublished - 2019
Externally publishedYes

    Research areas

  • contemplation, Husserl, phenomenology, presuppositionlessness, presuppositions, Rickert, theory of knowledge, беспредпосылочность, Гуссерль, предпосылки, Риккерт, созерцание, теория познания, феноменология

ID: 78486684