The subject of this article is the study of the philosophy of law and legal language within the Tomsk School of Analytic Philosophy (V.A. Surovtsev, V.V. Ogleznev, A.B. Didikin, and others). In a broad sense, the article examines the concepts of practical philosophy as normative concepts that take into account factors such as will, choice, value, interpretation, subjectivity, and so forth. In a narrower sense, this issue is explored in the context of analytical legal philosophy, drawing on the ideas of several representatives of the Tomsk School. Within this domain, the analytical method acquires a distinct methodological character. A tendency is observed toward moving from the philosophy of law to a broader context of practical philosophy, which in turn necessitates the development of a specific strategy and methodology for applying the analytical method. The first part of the article examines the reception of analytic philosophy of law through the ideas of John Austin, H.L.A. Hart, Friedrich Waismann, Peter Geach, and others. An analysis is conducted of such categories as "legal analysis," "language of law," "open texture," "performativity of legal statements," and related concepts. The second part of the article addresses the problem of ascriptivism, which occupies a central place in the problematics of legal language. It is shown that the logical and semantic features of such performative (ascriptive) statements are most clearly manifested not in abstract legal constructs, but in the practice of law enforcement. By not only researching but also introducing analytic philosophy of law into the Russian philosophical discourse, the theorists of the Tomsk School have approached the creation of a national school of analytical jurisprudence. In doing so, they have thoroughly examined both realist and anti-realist approaches. The third part of the article anticipates that the representatives of the Tomsk School, building on their work in the philosophy of law, will move toward a broader context of practical philosophy more generally. The following results were obtained during the study. By exploring issues in analytic philosophy of law, the representatives of the Tomsk School conclude that the analytical method acquires a distinct methodological character specific to this field. There is a tendency to move from the philosophy of law to a broader context of practical philosophy. Discourses on value, intention, will, subjectivity, and the like acquire significant importance. The problem of realism in analytic philosophy, which is of paramount importance to representatives of the Tomsk School, acquires its own distinct context within the field of practical philosophy-a context that is to some degree individual, which in turn requires the development of a specific strategy and methodology for applying the analytical method.