The author discusses the theoretical model of an integrated functional system of mental reflection and regulation of behavior and activity suggested by N.I. Chuprikova voprosy ps)chologii. 2016. N 6. P. 3-19). Recognizing the approach as useful and enriching psychological science, the author at the same time finds it limited within its capacity and dangerous outside of it. Applicability and potential of the aproach are discussed in the light of the issue of the subject of psychology. The author argues that N.I. Chuprikova's approach is limited in its initial tenets. The function of mind is not just maintaining the organism's interaction with the environment by reflecting its essential features, as implicitly follows from N.I. Chuprikova's theory. In this interpretation the psychological becomes an epiphenomenon, while it is 'the form of life which is usually described as that of the soul', according to A.V. Petrovsky and M.G. Yaroshevsky; "our perceptions, thoughts, feelings, our aspirations, intentions, desires etc. - All that constitutes the inner content of our life and that is given us in its immediacy in the form of experiencing", according to S.L. Rubistein. N.I. Chuprikova provides a detailed critical analysis of theories of mind and brain activity, but her attempts to distance herself from those approaches, to prove that her conception is not reductionist, appear to be nothing but declarations. The author argues that it is not physiological brain processes, but actual interaction of a whole living creature with the world that constitutes the material substance of the mental which, in its turn, is a systemic feature of that interaction and cannot be derived from individual brain processes. The author questions N.I. Chuprikova's statement that empirical and philosophic characteristics of consciousness are naturally integrated in the functional system of the mind and insists on a dialectic approach to man as a creature possessing consciousness and ftee will.