The Kurds in the Middle East, like other oppressed ethnic groups, were considered by the Communist International (Comintern) as an ally in advancing global revolution. The Comintern as an international association of Communist and radical groups was allied with the Soviet government, yet it pursued its own radical aims which later began to disturb the Soviet government and ended in its crushing by the late 1930s. Until its very end, Soviet Kurdish policy was unable to regain the level of intellectual pluralism that had existed prior to the mid-1930s. Contradictions between the Comintern and the Soviet government on Kurdish issues arose even earlier, especially over policies towards the Kurdish uprisings in Iraq and Turkey. Kurdish experts of the Comintern criticised the Kremlin’s support for Kemal and made plans to incite Kurdish uprisings in the Middle East. Using archival records, memoirs and private collections, the article reconstructs the Kurdish episodes in the policy of the Comintern, examining its implications for the Kurdish policy of the Soviet government and later Kurdish politics in the region. It focuses on the conceptual foundations and expert base of the Comintern’s Kurdish strategy. This is done by discussing both political documents and the activities of specific Comintern experts and functionaries involved in Kurdish issues.