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Wittgenstein's problem of rule-following and legal philosophy studies. / Ogleznev, Vitaly V.

в: Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Том 57, № 3, 2020, стр. 34-39.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданияхстатьяРецензирование

Harvard

Ogleznev, VV 2020, 'Wittgenstein's problem of rule-following and legal philosophy studies', Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Том. 57, № 3, стр. 34-39. https://doi.org/10.5840/EPS202057337

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Author

Ogleznev, Vitaly V. / Wittgenstein's problem of rule-following and legal philosophy studies. в: Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. 2020 ; Том 57, № 3. стр. 34-39.

BibTeX

@article{7e1a082391c8446da9f44ca0551ea700,
title = "Wittgenstein's problem of rule-following and legal philosophy studies",
abstract = "The article presents an analysis of K.A. Rodin's argument that after publishing of Peter Winch's book {"}The Idea of Social Science{"} (1958) the discussions of rule-following problem concerning to social epistemology and the methodology of social studies have not had tangible results. It is shown by the example of modern legal studies that this conclusion is not valid. On the contrary, Wittgenstein's problem of rule-following and the very idea of rule-shaped activity have proved to have a great importance for an analytical legal philosophy and turned into an independent subject of study.",
keywords = "Analytical legal philosophy, Legal language, Legal rule, Rule-following",
author = "Ogleznev, {Vitaly V.}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 RAS Institute of Philosophy. All rights reserved. Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.5840/EPS202057337",
language = "English",
volume = "57",
pages = "34--39",
journal = "ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИЯ И ФИЛОСОФИЯ НАУКИ",
issn = "1811-833X",
publisher = "Институт философии РАН",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Wittgenstein's problem of rule-following and legal philosophy studies

AU - Ogleznev, Vitaly V.

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020 RAS Institute of Philosophy. All rights reserved. Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - The article presents an analysis of K.A. Rodin's argument that after publishing of Peter Winch's book "The Idea of Social Science" (1958) the discussions of rule-following problem concerning to social epistemology and the methodology of social studies have not had tangible results. It is shown by the example of modern legal studies that this conclusion is not valid. On the contrary, Wittgenstein's problem of rule-following and the very idea of rule-shaped activity have proved to have a great importance for an analytical legal philosophy and turned into an independent subject of study.

AB - The article presents an analysis of K.A. Rodin's argument that after publishing of Peter Winch's book "The Idea of Social Science" (1958) the discussions of rule-following problem concerning to social epistemology and the methodology of social studies have not had tangible results. It is shown by the example of modern legal studies that this conclusion is not valid. On the contrary, Wittgenstein's problem of rule-following and the very idea of rule-shaped activity have proved to have a great importance for an analytical legal philosophy and turned into an independent subject of study.

KW - Analytical legal philosophy

KW - Legal language

KW - Legal rule

KW - Rule-following

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85092768817&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.5840/EPS202057337

DO - 10.5840/EPS202057337

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85092768817

VL - 57

SP - 34

EP - 39

JO - ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИЯ И ФИЛОСОФИЯ НАУКИ

JF - ЭПИСТЕМОЛОГИЯ И ФИЛОСОФИЯ НАУКИ

SN - 1811-833X

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 70422559