TY - GEN

T1 - Two Level Cooperation in Dynamic Network Games with Partner Sets

AU - Petrosyan, Leon

AU - Pankratova, Yaroslavna

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - In the presented paper, we consider dynamic network games with partner sets in which players cooperate to get the best outcomes. Using the game structure the two-level cooperative scheme is introduced. On the first level, the partner sets are considered as players, and the cooperative behavior is used in the game with partner sets, it is assumed that partners intend to maximize their joint payoff and then distribute it using a given optimality principle as usual in cooperative game theory. On the second level, the gain obtained by each player (partner set) is distributed among members of this partner set. The distribution of this gain is also made based on solution concepts from classical cooperative game theory. Since the game is dynamic the problem of time-consistency (dynamic stability) of the proposed two-level solution arises. To simplify the calculations the new characteristic function is introduced based on the possibility of cutting connections by players outside the coalition. Also, this newly defined characteristic function allows construction of time-consistent (dynamically stable) solutions.

AB - In the presented paper, we consider dynamic network games with partner sets in which players cooperate to get the best outcomes. Using the game structure the two-level cooperative scheme is introduced. On the first level, the partner sets are considered as players, and the cooperative behavior is used in the game with partner sets, it is assumed that partners intend to maximize their joint payoff and then distribute it using a given optimality principle as usual in cooperative game theory. On the second level, the gain obtained by each player (partner set) is distributed among members of this partner set. The distribution of this gain is also made based on solution concepts from classical cooperative game theory. Since the game is dynamic the problem of time-consistency (dynamic stability) of the proposed two-level solution arises. To simplify the calculations the new characteristic function is introduced based on the possibility of cutting connections by players outside the coalition. Also, this newly defined characteristic function allows construction of time-consistent (dynamically stable) solutions.

KW - Dynamic network game

KW - Partner set

KW - Shapley value

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85134187788&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/3dae07b3-fd66-3f62-92f7-982ac4665ae8/

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-09607-5_18

DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-09607-5_18

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85134187788

SN - 9783031096068

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

SP - 250

EP - 263

BT - Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research - 21st International Conference, MOTOR 2022, Proceedings

A2 - Pardalos, Panos

A2 - Khachay, Michael

A2 - Mazalov, Vladimir

PB - Springer Nature

T2 - 21st International Conference on Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research , MOTOR 2022

Y2 - 2 July 2022 through 6 July 2022

ER -