Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
Trade with Technology Spillover : A Dynamic Network Game Analysis. / Yeung, David W.K.; Petrosyan, Leon A.; Zhang, Yingxuan.
в: International Game Theory Review, Том 23, № 1, 2050011, 03.2021.Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Trade with Technology Spillover
T2 - A Dynamic Network Game Analysis
AU - Yeung, David W.K.
AU - Petrosyan, Leon A.
AU - Zhang, Yingxuan
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020 World Scientific Publishing Company. Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2021/3
Y1 - 2021/3
N2 - This paper presents a general class of dynamic network games to analyze trade with technology spillover. Due to the fact that the benefits of technology spillover are not fully accrued to the technology developer, the positive externalities are under-exploited. The cooperative solution yields an optimal outcome. To reflect the contributions of individual agents to the network, the Shapley value is used as a solution optimality principle in sharing the cooperative gains. A time-consistent payoff imputation procedure is derived to maintain the Shapley value at each stage of the cooperation. A representative model based on the general class of network games with explicit functional form is given. This is the first time that trade with technology spillover is studied in the framework of dynamic network games, further studies along this line are expected.
AB - This paper presents a general class of dynamic network games to analyze trade with technology spillover. Due to the fact that the benefits of technology spillover are not fully accrued to the technology developer, the positive externalities are under-exploited. The cooperative solution yields an optimal outcome. To reflect the contributions of individual agents to the network, the Shapley value is used as a solution optimality principle in sharing the cooperative gains. A time-consistent payoff imputation procedure is derived to maintain the Shapley value at each stage of the cooperation. A representative model based on the general class of network games with explicit functional form is given. This is the first time that trade with technology spillover is studied in the framework of dynamic network games, further studies along this line are expected.
KW - Dynamic game
KW - optimization
KW - Shapley value
KW - technology spillover
KW - trade network
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85095416551&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/c98a29f1-ff7d-38d0-b674-623debaca98e/
U2 - 10.1142/S0219198920500115
DO - 10.1142/S0219198920500115
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85095416551
VL - 23
JO - International Game Theory Review
JF - International Game Theory Review
SN - 0219-1989
IS - 1
M1 - 2050011
ER -
ID: 71179758