Standard

Trade with Technology Spillover : A Dynamic Network Game Analysis. / Yeung, David W.K.; Petrosyan, Leon A.; Zhang, Yingxuan.

в: International Game Theory Review, Том 23, № 1, 2050011, 03.2021.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданияхстатьяРецензирование

Harvard

Yeung, DWK, Petrosyan, LA & Zhang, Y 2021, 'Trade with Technology Spillover: A Dynamic Network Game Analysis', International Game Theory Review, Том. 23, № 1, 2050011. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198920500115

APA

Yeung, D. W. K., Petrosyan, L. A., & Zhang, Y. (2021). Trade with Technology Spillover: A Dynamic Network Game Analysis. International Game Theory Review, 23(1), [2050011]. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198920500115

Vancouver

Yeung DWK, Petrosyan LA, Zhang Y. Trade with Technology Spillover: A Dynamic Network Game Analysis. International Game Theory Review. 2021 Март;23(1). 2050011. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198920500115

Author

Yeung, David W.K. ; Petrosyan, Leon A. ; Zhang, Yingxuan. / Trade with Technology Spillover : A Dynamic Network Game Analysis. в: International Game Theory Review. 2021 ; Том 23, № 1.

BibTeX

@article{467567b9905c41608a7a248f42f4e5bb,
title = "Trade with Technology Spillover: A Dynamic Network Game Analysis",
abstract = "This paper presents a general class of dynamic network games to analyze trade with technology spillover. Due to the fact that the benefits of technology spillover are not fully accrued to the technology developer, the positive externalities are under-exploited. The cooperative solution yields an optimal outcome. To reflect the contributions of individual agents to the network, the Shapley value is used as a solution optimality principle in sharing the cooperative gains. A time-consistent payoff imputation procedure is derived to maintain the Shapley value at each stage of the cooperation. A representative model based on the general class of network games with explicit functional form is given. This is the first time that trade with technology spillover is studied in the framework of dynamic network games, further studies along this line are expected.",
keywords = "Dynamic game, optimization, Shapley value, technology spillover, trade network",
author = "Yeung, {David W.K.} and Petrosyan, {Leon A.} and Yingxuan Zhang",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 World Scientific Publishing Company. Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",
year = "2021",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1142/S0219198920500115",
language = "English",
volume = "23",
journal = "International Game Theory Review",
issn = "0219-1989",
publisher = "WORLD SCIENTIFIC PUBL CO PTE LTD",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Trade with Technology Spillover

T2 - A Dynamic Network Game Analysis

AU - Yeung, David W.K.

AU - Petrosyan, Leon A.

AU - Zhang, Yingxuan

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2020 World Scientific Publishing Company. Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2021/3

Y1 - 2021/3

N2 - This paper presents a general class of dynamic network games to analyze trade with technology spillover. Due to the fact that the benefits of technology spillover are not fully accrued to the technology developer, the positive externalities are under-exploited. The cooperative solution yields an optimal outcome. To reflect the contributions of individual agents to the network, the Shapley value is used as a solution optimality principle in sharing the cooperative gains. A time-consistent payoff imputation procedure is derived to maintain the Shapley value at each stage of the cooperation. A representative model based on the general class of network games with explicit functional form is given. This is the first time that trade with technology spillover is studied in the framework of dynamic network games, further studies along this line are expected.

AB - This paper presents a general class of dynamic network games to analyze trade with technology spillover. Due to the fact that the benefits of technology spillover are not fully accrued to the technology developer, the positive externalities are under-exploited. The cooperative solution yields an optimal outcome. To reflect the contributions of individual agents to the network, the Shapley value is used as a solution optimality principle in sharing the cooperative gains. A time-consistent payoff imputation procedure is derived to maintain the Shapley value at each stage of the cooperation. A representative model based on the general class of network games with explicit functional form is given. This is the first time that trade with technology spillover is studied in the framework of dynamic network games, further studies along this line are expected.

KW - Dynamic game

KW - optimization

KW - Shapley value

KW - technology spillover

KW - trade network

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85095416551&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/c98a29f1-ff7d-38d0-b674-623debaca98e/

U2 - 10.1142/S0219198920500115

DO - 10.1142/S0219198920500115

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85095416551

VL - 23

JO - International Game Theory Review

JF - International Game Theory Review

SN - 0219-1989

IS - 1

M1 - 2050011

ER -

ID: 71179758