Standard

The Structure of Corporate Boards and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange. / Muravyev, A.; Berezinets, I.; Ilina, Y.

в: International Review of Financial Analysis, № 34, 2014, стр. 247-261.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья

Harvard

Muravyev, A, Berezinets, I & Ilina, Y 2014, 'The Structure of Corporate Boards and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange', International Review of Financial Analysis, № 34, стр. 247-261. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2014.03.008

APA

Muravyev, A., Berezinets, I., & Ilina, Y. (2014). The Structure of Corporate Boards and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange. International Review of Financial Analysis, (34), 247-261. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2014.03.008

Vancouver

Muravyev A, Berezinets I, Ilina Y. The Structure of Corporate Boards and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange. International Review of Financial Analysis. 2014;(34):247-261. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2014.03.008

Author

Muravyev, A. ; Berezinets, I. ; Ilina, Y. / The Structure of Corporate Boards and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange. в: International Review of Financial Analysis. 2014 ; № 34. стр. 247-261.

BibTeX

@article{ef6c24b9e3984335ae345a790a1a4aa9,
title = "The Structure of Corporate Boards and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange",
abstract = "This paper revisits the role of board size and composition in corporate governance, employing a measure of private benefits of control (PBC) as an indicator of governance problems in firms.We calculate PBC using the voting premium approach for a sample of dual class stock companies traded on the Russian stock exchange between 1998 and 2009. Using fixed-effects regressions, we find a quadratic relationship between PBC and board size, implying the optimality of medium-sized (about 11 directors) supervisory boards. This result is substantially stronger for PBC than traditional measures of corporate performance. There is also some evidence that director ownership helps to mitigate governance problems. Most remarkably, we find that non-executive/independent directors are associated with larger PBC and thus do not seem to help improve corporate governance. In contrast, regressions with accounting performance measures as dependent variables tend to suggest a positive role of these directors in corporate governance.",
keywords = "board size, board independence, private benefits of control, Dual-class stock companies, Russia, SCOPUS, WOS",
author = "A. Muravyev and I. Berezinets and Y. Ilina",
note = "Muravyev, A. The Structure of Corporate Boards and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange / A. Muravyev, I. V. Berezinets, Yu. B. Ilina // International Review of Financial Analysis. – 2014. - № 34. – P. 247-261. ",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1016/j.irfa.2014.03.008",
language = "English",
pages = "247--261",
journal = "International Review of Financial Analysis",
issn = "1057-5219",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "34",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Structure of Corporate Boards and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange

AU - Muravyev, A.

AU - Berezinets, I.

AU - Ilina, Y.

N1 - Muravyev, A. The Structure of Corporate Boards and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange / A. Muravyev, I. V. Berezinets, Yu. B. Ilina // International Review of Financial Analysis. – 2014. - № 34. – P. 247-261.

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - This paper revisits the role of board size and composition in corporate governance, employing a measure of private benefits of control (PBC) as an indicator of governance problems in firms.We calculate PBC using the voting premium approach for a sample of dual class stock companies traded on the Russian stock exchange between 1998 and 2009. Using fixed-effects regressions, we find a quadratic relationship between PBC and board size, implying the optimality of medium-sized (about 11 directors) supervisory boards. This result is substantially stronger for PBC than traditional measures of corporate performance. There is also some evidence that director ownership helps to mitigate governance problems. Most remarkably, we find that non-executive/independent directors are associated with larger PBC and thus do not seem to help improve corporate governance. In contrast, regressions with accounting performance measures as dependent variables tend to suggest a positive role of these directors in corporate governance.

AB - This paper revisits the role of board size and composition in corporate governance, employing a measure of private benefits of control (PBC) as an indicator of governance problems in firms.We calculate PBC using the voting premium approach for a sample of dual class stock companies traded on the Russian stock exchange between 1998 and 2009. Using fixed-effects regressions, we find a quadratic relationship between PBC and board size, implying the optimality of medium-sized (about 11 directors) supervisory boards. This result is substantially stronger for PBC than traditional measures of corporate performance. There is also some evidence that director ownership helps to mitigate governance problems. Most remarkably, we find that non-executive/independent directors are associated with larger PBC and thus do not seem to help improve corporate governance. In contrast, regressions with accounting performance measures as dependent variables tend to suggest a positive role of these directors in corporate governance.

KW - board size

KW - board independence

KW - private benefits of control

KW - Dual-class stock companies

KW - Russia

KW - SCOPUS

KW - WOS

U2 - 10.1016/j.irfa.2014.03.008

DO - 10.1016/j.irfa.2014.03.008

M3 - Article

SP - 247

EP - 261

JO - International Review of Financial Analysis

JF - International Review of Financial Analysis

SN - 1057-5219

IS - 34

ER -

ID: 7030187