DOI

The core as a solution to a cooperative game has the advantage that any imputation from it is undominated. In cooperative dynamic games, there is a known transformation that demonstrates another advantage of the core-time consistency-keeping players adhering to it during the course of the game. Such a transformation may change the solution, so it is essential that the new core share common imputations with the original one. In this paper, we will establish the relationship between the original core of a dynamic game and the core after the transformation, and demonstrate that the latter can be a subset of the former.

Язык оригиналаАнглийский
Номер статьи1023
Число страниц13
ЖурналMathematics
Том8
Номер выпуска6
DOI
СостояниеОпубликовано - 1 июн 2020

    Предметные области Scopus

  • Математика (все)

ID: 60765468