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The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration. / Kolokoltsov, Vassili.

в: Mathematics of Operations Research, Том 42, № 4, 11.2017, стр. 915-944.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданияхстатьяРецензирование

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Kolokoltsov, Vassili. / The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration. в: Mathematics of Operations Research. 2017 ; Том 42, № 4. стр. 915-944.

BibTeX

@article{47b7d62776894d42a7d88fd83df5533f,
title = "The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration",
abstract = "In this paper we extend the framework of the evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions to address the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the large group of small players who can resist this pressure or collaborate with the major player. We prove rigorous results on the convergence of various Markov decision models of interacting small agents (including evolutionary growth), i.e., pairwise, in groups and by coalition formation, to a deterministic evolution on the distributions of the state spaces of small players paying main attention to situations with an infinite state-space of small players. We supply precise rates of convergence. The theoretical results of the paper are applied to the analysis of the processes of inspection, corruption, cyber-security, counterterrorism, banks and firms merging, strategically enhanced preferential attachment, and many other.",
keywords = "Coalition growth, Corruption, Counterterrorism, Crime prevention, Cyber-security, Evolutionary game, Geopolitics, Inspection, Law of large numbers, Major player, Networking, Optimal allocation, Pressure and resistance, Social norms, Strategically enhanced preferential attachment",
author = "Vassili Kolokoltsov",
year = "2017",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1287/moor.2016.0838",
language = "English",
volume = "42",
pages = "915--944",
journal = "Mathematics of Operations Research",
issn = "0364-765X",
publisher = "INFORMS",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration

AU - Kolokoltsov, Vassili

PY - 2017/11

Y1 - 2017/11

N2 - In this paper we extend the framework of the evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions to address the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the large group of small players who can resist this pressure or collaborate with the major player. We prove rigorous results on the convergence of various Markov decision models of interacting small agents (including evolutionary growth), i.e., pairwise, in groups and by coalition formation, to a deterministic evolution on the distributions of the state spaces of small players paying main attention to situations with an infinite state-space of small players. We supply precise rates of convergence. The theoretical results of the paper are applied to the analysis of the processes of inspection, corruption, cyber-security, counterterrorism, banks and firms merging, strategically enhanced preferential attachment, and many other.

AB - In this paper we extend the framework of the evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions to address the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the large group of small players who can resist this pressure or collaborate with the major player. We prove rigorous results on the convergence of various Markov decision models of interacting small agents (including evolutionary growth), i.e., pairwise, in groups and by coalition formation, to a deterministic evolution on the distributions of the state spaces of small players paying main attention to situations with an infinite state-space of small players. We supply precise rates of convergence. The theoretical results of the paper are applied to the analysis of the processes of inspection, corruption, cyber-security, counterterrorism, banks and firms merging, strategically enhanced preferential attachment, and many other.

KW - Coalition growth

KW - Corruption

KW - Counterterrorism

KW - Crime prevention

KW - Cyber-security

KW - Evolutionary game

KW - Geopolitics

KW - Inspection

KW - Law of large numbers

KW - Major player

KW - Networking

KW - Optimal allocation

KW - Pressure and resistance

KW - Social norms

KW - Strategically enhanced preferential attachment

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85032970873&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1287/moor.2016.0838

DO - 10.1287/moor.2016.0838

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85032970873

VL - 42

SP - 915

EP - 944

JO - Mathematics of Operations Research

JF - Mathematics of Operations Research

SN - 0364-765X

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 51530693