Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration. / Kolokoltsov, Vassili.
в: Mathematics of Operations Research, Том 42, № 4, 11.2017, стр. 915-944.Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration
AU - Kolokoltsov, Vassili
PY - 2017/11
Y1 - 2017/11
N2 - In this paper we extend the framework of the evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions to address the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the large group of small players who can resist this pressure or collaborate with the major player. We prove rigorous results on the convergence of various Markov decision models of interacting small agents (including evolutionary growth), i.e., pairwise, in groups and by coalition formation, to a deterministic evolution on the distributions of the state spaces of small players paying main attention to situations with an infinite state-space of small players. We supply precise rates of convergence. The theoretical results of the paper are applied to the analysis of the processes of inspection, corruption, cyber-security, counterterrorism, banks and firms merging, strategically enhanced preferential attachment, and many other.
AB - In this paper we extend the framework of the evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions to address the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the large group of small players who can resist this pressure or collaborate with the major player. We prove rigorous results on the convergence of various Markov decision models of interacting small agents (including evolutionary growth), i.e., pairwise, in groups and by coalition formation, to a deterministic evolution on the distributions of the state spaces of small players paying main attention to situations with an infinite state-space of small players. We supply precise rates of convergence. The theoretical results of the paper are applied to the analysis of the processes of inspection, corruption, cyber-security, counterterrorism, banks and firms merging, strategically enhanced preferential attachment, and many other.
KW - Coalition growth
KW - Corruption
KW - Counterterrorism
KW - Crime prevention
KW - Cyber-security
KW - Evolutionary game
KW - Geopolitics
KW - Inspection
KW - Law of large numbers
KW - Major player
KW - Networking
KW - Optimal allocation
KW - Pressure and resistance
KW - Social norms
KW - Strategically enhanced preferential attachment
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85032970873&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1287/moor.2016.0838
DO - 10.1287/moor.2016.0838
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85032970873
VL - 42
SP - 915
EP - 944
JO - Mathematics of Operations Research
JF - Mathematics of Operations Research
SN - 0364-765X
IS - 4
ER -
ID: 51530693