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The Effect of Interpersonal Political Embeddedness on Firm Internationalization Scope. / Sawant, Rajeev J.; Nachum, Lilac; Panibratov, Andrei Yu.

в: British Journal of Management, Том 32, № 3, 07.2021, стр. 812-831.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданияхстатьяРецензирование

Harvard

Sawant, RJ, Nachum, L & Panibratov, AY 2021, 'The Effect of Interpersonal Political Embeddedness on Firm Internationalization Scope', British Journal of Management, Том. 32, № 3, стр. 812-831. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12430

APA

Vancouver

Author

Sawant, Rajeev J. ; Nachum, Lilac ; Panibratov, Andrei Yu. / The Effect of Interpersonal Political Embeddedness on Firm Internationalization Scope. в: British Journal of Management. 2021 ; Том 32, № 3. стр. 812-831.

BibTeX

@article{4d458f673a724d78a93b1ff00edceefb,
title = "The Effect of Interpersonal Political Embeddedness on Firm Internationalization Scope",
abstract = "How does a firm's political embeddedness affect its internationalization strategy? Extant research shows conflicting effects, treating embeddedness as a unitary construct. We contend that interpersonal relational political embeddedness (IPE) is distinct from the structure of embedded ties and focus on IPE's consequences for firm internationalization. IPE refers to dyadic, interpersonal relationships of trust, loyalty and reciprocity between individuals. We theorize that IPE increases firm susceptibility to dependence asymmetry, which increases as the power of the political actor increases. Dependence asymmetry increases political encroachment in firm decision-making. Because political actors prefer domestic investments, greater dependence asymmetry in IPE reduces firm foreign direct investment (FDI) scope. Political preferences for domestic investments may be reduced for host countries that have cooperative relationships with the home country, which reduces the negative effect of greater dependence asymmetry in IPE on FDI scope. IPE may also reduce firm motivation and ability to develop political risk management capabilities. Thus, host country political risk increases the negative effect of greater dependence asymmetry in IPE on FDI scope. Our empirical analysis of a sample of 285 firms – examining the political experience and relationships of 1,521 directors and 311 top managers in Russia – supports this theory. We contribute to the theory regarding firm political embeddedness and internationalization strategy.",
keywords = "FOREIGN DIRECT-INVESTMENT, HOME COUNTRY INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC ALLIANCES, EMERGING MARKETS, PERFORMANCE, CONNECTIONS, DYNAMICS, NETWORK, RISK, NONMARKET",
author = "Sawant, {Rajeev J.} and Lilac Nachum and Panibratov, {Andrei Yu}",
note = "Sawant, R. J. The Effect of Interpersonal Political Embeddedness on Firm Internationalization Scope / R. J. Sawant, L. Nachum, A. Panibratov // British Journal of Management. - 2020. - Volume 32, Issue 3. - P. 812-831. Publisher Copyright:{\textcopyright} 2020 British Academy of Management and Wiley Periodicals LLC",
year = "2021",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1111/1467-8551.12430",
language = "English",
volume = "32",
pages = "812--831",
journal = "British Journal of Management",
issn = "1045-3172",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Effect of Interpersonal Political Embeddedness on Firm Internationalization Scope

AU - Sawant, Rajeev J.

AU - Nachum, Lilac

AU - Panibratov, Andrei Yu

N1 - Sawant, R. J. The Effect of Interpersonal Political Embeddedness on Firm Internationalization Scope / R. J. Sawant, L. Nachum, A. Panibratov // British Journal of Management. - 2020. - Volume 32, Issue 3. - P. 812-831. Publisher Copyright:© 2020 British Academy of Management and Wiley Periodicals LLC

PY - 2021/7

Y1 - 2021/7

N2 - How does a firm's political embeddedness affect its internationalization strategy? Extant research shows conflicting effects, treating embeddedness as a unitary construct. We contend that interpersonal relational political embeddedness (IPE) is distinct from the structure of embedded ties and focus on IPE's consequences for firm internationalization. IPE refers to dyadic, interpersonal relationships of trust, loyalty and reciprocity between individuals. We theorize that IPE increases firm susceptibility to dependence asymmetry, which increases as the power of the political actor increases. Dependence asymmetry increases political encroachment in firm decision-making. Because political actors prefer domestic investments, greater dependence asymmetry in IPE reduces firm foreign direct investment (FDI) scope. Political preferences for domestic investments may be reduced for host countries that have cooperative relationships with the home country, which reduces the negative effect of greater dependence asymmetry in IPE on FDI scope. IPE may also reduce firm motivation and ability to develop political risk management capabilities. Thus, host country political risk increases the negative effect of greater dependence asymmetry in IPE on FDI scope. Our empirical analysis of a sample of 285 firms – examining the political experience and relationships of 1,521 directors and 311 top managers in Russia – supports this theory. We contribute to the theory regarding firm political embeddedness and internationalization strategy.

AB - How does a firm's political embeddedness affect its internationalization strategy? Extant research shows conflicting effects, treating embeddedness as a unitary construct. We contend that interpersonal relational political embeddedness (IPE) is distinct from the structure of embedded ties and focus on IPE's consequences for firm internationalization. IPE refers to dyadic, interpersonal relationships of trust, loyalty and reciprocity between individuals. We theorize that IPE increases firm susceptibility to dependence asymmetry, which increases as the power of the political actor increases. Dependence asymmetry increases political encroachment in firm decision-making. Because political actors prefer domestic investments, greater dependence asymmetry in IPE reduces firm foreign direct investment (FDI) scope. Political preferences for domestic investments may be reduced for host countries that have cooperative relationships with the home country, which reduces the negative effect of greater dependence asymmetry in IPE on FDI scope. IPE may also reduce firm motivation and ability to develop political risk management capabilities. Thus, host country political risk increases the negative effect of greater dependence asymmetry in IPE on FDI scope. Our empirical analysis of a sample of 285 firms – examining the political experience and relationships of 1,521 directors and 311 top managers in Russia – supports this theory. We contribute to the theory regarding firm political embeddedness and internationalization strategy.

KW - FOREIGN DIRECT-INVESTMENT

KW - HOME COUNTRY INSTITUTIONS

KW - STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

KW - EMERGING MARKETS

KW - PERFORMANCE

KW - CONNECTIONS

KW - DYNAMICS

KW - NETWORK

KW - RISK

KW - NONMARKET

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85089961956&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/dfcfb491-24d8-39ff-951d-66174b459980/

U2 - 10.1111/1467-8551.12430

DO - 10.1111/1467-8551.12430

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85089961956

VL - 32

SP - 812

EP - 831

JO - British Journal of Management

JF - British Journal of Management

SN - 1045-3172

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 88093658