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The Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution for 2-Stage Cost Sharing Game. / Li, Yin.

в: Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Том 13, 2020, стр. 296-303.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданияхстатья

Harvard

Li, Y 2020, 'The Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution for 2-Stage Cost Sharing Game.', Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Том. 13, стр. 296-303. <http://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=43973995>

APA

Vancouver

Li Y. The Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution for 2-Stage Cost Sharing Game. Contributions to Game Theory and Management. 2020;13:296-303.

Author

Li, Yin. / The Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution for 2-Stage Cost Sharing Game. в: Contributions to Game Theory and Management. 2020 ; Том 13. стр. 296-303.

BibTeX

@article{4c6a59fab8724534bc560ab0cf808100,
title = "The Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution for 2-Stage Cost Sharing Game.",
abstract = "The problem of constructing the Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution in a 2-stage game is studied. In each stage, a minimum cost spanning tree game is played, all players select strategy profiles to construct graphs in the stage game. At the second stage, players may change the graph using strategy profiles with transition probabilities, which decided by players in the first stage. The players' cooperative behavior is considered. As solution the Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution is proposed. A theorem is proved to allow the Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution to be time-consistent.",
keywords = "dynamic game, Dynamic Nash Bargaining, Minimum cost spanning tree, dynamic game, Dynamic Nash Bargaining, Minimum cost spanning tree",
author = "Yin Li",
year = "2020",
language = "English",
volume = "13",
pages = "296--303",
journal = "Contributions to Game Theory and Management",
issn = "2310-2608",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution for 2-Stage Cost Sharing Game.

AU - Li, Yin

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - The problem of constructing the Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution in a 2-stage game is studied. In each stage, a minimum cost spanning tree game is played, all players select strategy profiles to construct graphs in the stage game. At the second stage, players may change the graph using strategy profiles with transition probabilities, which decided by players in the first stage. The players' cooperative behavior is considered. As solution the Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution is proposed. A theorem is proved to allow the Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution to be time-consistent.

AB - The problem of constructing the Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution in a 2-stage game is studied. In each stage, a minimum cost spanning tree game is played, all players select strategy profiles to construct graphs in the stage game. At the second stage, players may change the graph using strategy profiles with transition probabilities, which decided by players in the first stage. The players' cooperative behavior is considered. As solution the Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution is proposed. A theorem is proved to allow the Dynamic Nash Bargaining Solution to be time-consistent.

KW - dynamic game

KW - Dynamic Nash Bargaining

KW - Minimum cost spanning tree

KW - dynamic game

KW - Dynamic Nash Bargaining

KW - Minimum cost spanning tree

M3 - Article

VL - 13

SP - 296

EP - 303

JO - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

JF - Contributions to Game Theory and Management

SN - 2310-2608

ER -

ID: 78570747