The paper considers trade and finance flow limitation measures of countries that are involved in the global economy. Authors clarify the terminology, particularly, they argue that discriminatory measures against Russia as well as Russian responding measures can't be called sanctions. Only supranational unions, which have particular authority to implement sanctions toward its members, can use this instrument. Embargo and boycott are regarded as extreme forms of competitive struggle between national economies. The efficiency of limitation measures on goods and capital movement is estimated by matching benefits and losses from these measures for the national economy, not by matching the losses of contractors. In the short run boycott is more effective than embargo, because it leads to the growth of industries that are protected by the trade barrier. The embargo, in turn, is less effective, due to the variety of trade links in the global economy. The analysis of Russian protectionist trade measures for agricultural industry shows that there was rapid sectoral growth of domestic production and displace of agricultural import with short-term recoupment. In capital-intensive sectors, there has been a change in sales geography. It is expected that in the long run boycott will lead to loss in effectiveness and competitiveness, and embargo will restrain economic growth by preventing effective industry development.