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Sustainable solution for hybrid differential game with regime shifts and random duration. / Ву, Ийлунь; Тур, Анна Викторовна; Е, Пэйчэнь.

в: Nonlinear Analysis: Hybrid Systems, Том 55, 101553, 01.02.2025.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование

Harvard

Ву, И, Тур, АВ & Е, П 2025, 'Sustainable solution for hybrid differential game with regime shifts and random duration', Nonlinear Analysis: Hybrid Systems, Том. 55, 101553. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nahs.2024.101553

APA

Ву, И., Тур, А. В., & Е, П. (2025). Sustainable solution for hybrid differential game with regime shifts and random duration. Nonlinear Analysis: Hybrid Systems, 55, [101553]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nahs.2024.101553

Vancouver

Ву И, Тур АВ, Е П. Sustainable solution for hybrid differential game with regime shifts and random duration. Nonlinear Analysis: Hybrid Systems. 2025 Февр. 1;55. 101553. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nahs.2024.101553

Author

Ву, Ийлунь ; Тур, Анна Викторовна ; Е, Пэйчэнь. / Sustainable solution for hybrid differential game with regime shifts and random duration. в: Nonlinear Analysis: Hybrid Systems. 2025 ; Том 55.

BibTeX

@article{b4e75bb56e3e43c79dfe06f89419b022,
title = "Sustainable solution for hybrid differential game with regime shifts and random duration",
abstract = "Switching phenomena are ubiquitous in real-world applications. An n-player hybrid pollution-control problem is considered with switching behavior and uncertain game duration. The payoff functional with a random duration is converted to a payoff functional in the infinite horizon, which is discounted by a heterogeneous discounting function. By applying Pontryagin's maximum principle and analyzing the structure of the adjoint variable, the sustainable equilibria in cooperative and noncooperative games are uniquely determined. The convergence of the corresponding state variable in cooperative and noncooperative games is proved. Furthermore, a unique state trajectory represented by a hybrid limit cycle is found to compute the players{\textquoteright} payoffs in cooperative and noncooperative scenarios. Finally, a reasonable, cooperative solution that employs the Shapley value as a single-point solution is proposed. All results are derived analytically and demonstrated with a numerical example.",
keywords = "Hybrid differential games, Random duration, Regime shift, Shapley value, Sustainable equilibria",
author = "Ийлунь Ву and Тур, {Анна Викторовна} and Пэйчэнь Е",
year = "2024",
doi = "10.1016/j.nahs.2024.101553",
language = "English",
volume = "55",
journal = "Nonlinear Analysis: Hybrid Systems",
issn = "1751-570X",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Sustainable solution for hybrid differential game with regime shifts and random duration

AU - Ву, Ийлунь

AU - Тур, Анна Викторовна

AU - Е, Пэйчэнь

PY - 2024

Y1 - 2024

N2 - Switching phenomena are ubiquitous in real-world applications. An n-player hybrid pollution-control problem is considered with switching behavior and uncertain game duration. The payoff functional with a random duration is converted to a payoff functional in the infinite horizon, which is discounted by a heterogeneous discounting function. By applying Pontryagin's maximum principle and analyzing the structure of the adjoint variable, the sustainable equilibria in cooperative and noncooperative games are uniquely determined. The convergence of the corresponding state variable in cooperative and noncooperative games is proved. Furthermore, a unique state trajectory represented by a hybrid limit cycle is found to compute the players’ payoffs in cooperative and noncooperative scenarios. Finally, a reasonable, cooperative solution that employs the Shapley value as a single-point solution is proposed. All results are derived analytically and demonstrated with a numerical example.

AB - Switching phenomena are ubiquitous in real-world applications. An n-player hybrid pollution-control problem is considered with switching behavior and uncertain game duration. The payoff functional with a random duration is converted to a payoff functional in the infinite horizon, which is discounted by a heterogeneous discounting function. By applying Pontryagin's maximum principle and analyzing the structure of the adjoint variable, the sustainable equilibria in cooperative and noncooperative games are uniquely determined. The convergence of the corresponding state variable in cooperative and noncooperative games is proved. Furthermore, a unique state trajectory represented by a hybrid limit cycle is found to compute the players’ payoffs in cooperative and noncooperative scenarios. Finally, a reasonable, cooperative solution that employs the Shapley value as a single-point solution is proposed. All results are derived analytically and demonstrated with a numerical example.

KW - Hybrid differential games

KW - Random duration

KW - Regime shift

KW - Shapley value

KW - Sustainable equilibria

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/b0b26583-d732-35cb-b75a-bc4e3ff2b55e/

U2 - 10.1016/j.nahs.2024.101553

DO - 10.1016/j.nahs.2024.101553

M3 - Article

VL - 55

JO - Nonlinear Analysis: Hybrid Systems

JF - Nonlinear Analysis: Hybrid Systems

SN - 1751-570X

M1 - 101553

ER -

ID: 127098948