Standard

Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solution of Dynamic Games with Random Horizon. / Yeung, D. W. K.; Petrosyan, L. A.

в: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Том 150, № 1, 07.2011, стр. 78-97.

Результаты исследований: Научные публикации в периодических изданиях › статья › Рецензирование

Harvard

Yeung, DWK & Petrosyan, LA 2011, 'Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solution of Dynamic Games with Random Horizon', Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Том. 150, № 1, стр. 78-97. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-011-9824-4, https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1007/s10957-011-9824-4

APA

Yeung, D. W. K., & Petrosyan, L. A. (2011). Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solution of Dynamic Games with Random Horizon. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 150(1), 78-97. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-011-9824-4, https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1007/s10957-011-9824-4

Vancouver

Yeung DWK, Petrosyan LA. Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solution of Dynamic Games with Random Horizon. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications. 2011 Июль;150(1):78-97. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-011-9824-4, https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1007/s10957-011-9824-4

Author

Yeung, D. W. K. ; Petrosyan, L. A. / Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solution of Dynamic Games with Random Horizon. в: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications. 2011 ; Том 150, № 1. стр. 78-97.

BibTeX

@article{c3530123e24345029b43cbba7ee8e96d,
title = "Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solution of Dynamic Games with Random Horizon",
abstract = "In cooperative dynamic games, a stringent condition-that of subgame consistency-is required for a dynamically stable cooperative solution. In particular, under a subgame-consistent cooperative solution an extension of the solution policy to a subgame starting at a later time with a state brought about by prior optimal behavior will remain optimal. This paper extends subgame-consistent solutions to dynamic (discrete-time) cooperative games with random horizon. In the analysis, new forms of the Bellman equation and the Isaacs-Bellman equation in discrete-time are derived. Subgame-consistent cooperative solutions are obtained for this class of dynamic games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution mechanisms, which lead to the realization of these solutions, are developed. This is the first time that subgame-consistent solutions for cooperative dynamic games with random horizon are presented.",
keywords = "Dynamic games, Random horizon, Cooperation, Subgame consistency, DIFFERENTIAL GAME",
author = "Yeung, {D. W. K.} and Petrosyan, {L. A.}",
year = "2011",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1007/s10957-011-9824-4",
language = "Английский",
volume = "150",
pages = "78--97",
journal = "Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications",
issn = "0022-3239",
publisher = "Springer Nature",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solution of Dynamic Games with Random Horizon

AU - Yeung, D. W. K.

AU - Petrosyan, L. A.

PY - 2011/7

Y1 - 2011/7

N2 - In cooperative dynamic games, a stringent condition-that of subgame consistency-is required for a dynamically stable cooperative solution. In particular, under a subgame-consistent cooperative solution an extension of the solution policy to a subgame starting at a later time with a state brought about by prior optimal behavior will remain optimal. This paper extends subgame-consistent solutions to dynamic (discrete-time) cooperative games with random horizon. In the analysis, new forms of the Bellman equation and the Isaacs-Bellman equation in discrete-time are derived. Subgame-consistent cooperative solutions are obtained for this class of dynamic games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution mechanisms, which lead to the realization of these solutions, are developed. This is the first time that subgame-consistent solutions for cooperative dynamic games with random horizon are presented.

AB - In cooperative dynamic games, a stringent condition-that of subgame consistency-is required for a dynamically stable cooperative solution. In particular, under a subgame-consistent cooperative solution an extension of the solution policy to a subgame starting at a later time with a state brought about by prior optimal behavior will remain optimal. This paper extends subgame-consistent solutions to dynamic (discrete-time) cooperative games with random horizon. In the analysis, new forms of the Bellman equation and the Isaacs-Bellman equation in discrete-time are derived. Subgame-consistent cooperative solutions are obtained for this class of dynamic games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution mechanisms, which lead to the realization of these solutions, are developed. This is the first time that subgame-consistent solutions for cooperative dynamic games with random horizon are presented.

KW - Dynamic games

KW - Random horizon

KW - Cooperation

KW - Subgame consistency

KW - DIFFERENTIAL GAME

U2 - 10.1007/s10957-011-9824-4

DO - 10.1007/s10957-011-9824-4

M3 - статья

VL - 150

SP - 78

EP - 97

JO - Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

JF - Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

SN - 0022-3239

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 5320842