TY - JOUR

T1 - Strongly Subgame-Consistent Core in Stochastic Games

AU - Parilina, E. M.

AU - Petrosyan, L. A.

PY - 2018/8/1

Y1 - 2018/8/1

N2 - This paper investigates stochastic games on finite tree graphs. A given n-player normal-form game is defined at each node of a tree. Transition to a next node of the tree is random and depends on the strategy profile realized in a current game. We construct a cooperative solution of the game by maximizing the total expected payoff of the players. The core is used as the solution concept of the cooperative game. We introduce the definition of a strongly subgame-consistent (strongly time-consistent) core. Finally, we suggest a method for designing a cooperative distribution procedure of an imputation from the core that guarantees its strong subgame consistency.

AB - This paper investigates stochastic games on finite tree graphs. A given n-player normal-form game is defined at each node of a tree. Transition to a next node of the tree is random and depends on the strategy profile realized in a current game. We construct a cooperative solution of the game by maximizing the total expected payoff of the players. The core is used as the solution concept of the cooperative game. We introduce the definition of a strongly subgame-consistent (strongly time-consistent) core. Finally, we suggest a method for designing a cooperative distribution procedure of an imputation from the core that guarantees its strong subgame consistency.

KW - core

KW - stochastic game

KW - strong subgame consistency

KW - strong time consistency

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85051550873&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1134/S0005117918080118

DO - 10.1134/S0005117918080118

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85051550873

VL - 79

SP - 1515

EP - 1527

JO - Automation and Remote Control

JF - Automation and Remote Control

SN - 0005-1179

IS - 8

ER -